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THE PANDA'S THUMB: THE MODEST AND MERCANTILIST
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Calvin H. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
The third power listed in the Constitution's description of federal powers gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with Indian tribes
and among the states.' In the original debates over adoption of the Constitution,
"regulation of commerce" was used, almost exclusively, as a cover of words for
specific mercantilist proposals related to deep-water shipping and foreign trade. The
Constitution was written before Adam Smith, laissez faire, and free trade came to
dominate economic thinking' and the Commerce Clause draws its original meaning
from the preceding mercantilist tradition. All of the concrete programs intended to
be forwarded by giving Congress the power to regulate commerce were restrictions
on international trade giving subsidy or protection to favored domestic merchants
or punishing imports or foreign producers.' Neither trade with the Indians nor
interstate commerce shows up as a significant issue in the original debates.
* Andrews and Kurth Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas. © Calvin H.
Johnson.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 See, e.g., JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF INDEPENDENCE: NEOMERCANTILISM
ANDTHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION xi (1993) (stating that a book about the influence of Smith
on the American revolutionary generation would be "very short"); DOUGLAS IRWIN, AGAINST
THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 80 (1996). Adam Smith's free trade
ideas were published in his 1776 work, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS.
' Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 448 (1941).
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None of the nontax proposals covered by "regulation of commerce" ever
amounted to much even once the ratified Constitution gave Congress the author-
ity to adopt them. "Regulation of commerce" was used to describe a proposal to na-
tionalize the state "imposts" or tariffs on imports and that was important. The
federal government desperately needed revenue to pay the Revolutionary War debts.
Indeed, giving the federal government power to tax for the national defense is a
major purpose for the Constitution.4 But the Tax Clause' gives Congress the power
to tax for the common defense and general welfare and that seems adequate to
justify the federal impost without the power to regulate commerce. If the impost is
treated, reasonably, as a tax rather than a commerce power, then the other programs
covered by "regulation of commerce" did not prove to have enough support for
adoption by Congress, even once the Constitution authorized them. The failure of
the proposals acts a referendum, as close to the Constitution as we can expect, that
shows that the programs intended by "regulation of commerce" did not have
majority support. Programs that a majority did not want even once allowed cannot
be used as important causal weights in explaining why the Constitution was adopted.
The power to regulate commerce was written to authorize specific mercantilist
proposals that the country did not in fact want. The Commerce Clause has been
aptly described as "a modest little power."6
Many of the things now said about the Commerce Clause are not viable
descriptions of the original meaning. The Commerce Clause is now said to be a
"strong impetus for calling the Constitutional Convention." ' That interpretation
cannot stand in the face of the failure to adopt the concrete programs that "regulation
of commerce" was originally meant to describe. It is not uncommon to find
descriptions of the constitutional document as "a part of the liberal, free trade
tradition."'  The programs articulated under "regulation of commerce" in the
4 See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003)
(arguing that the Constitution was adopted to give federal government revenue to provide for
the national defense). CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER ATTHEWICKED STATES: THE
MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that revenue for
defense was a proximate cause of the Constitution, but tax to restore the public credit turned
out to be too easy for tax to be a sufficient explanation for the revolutionary changes the
Constitution effected).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Imposts must, however, have uniform rates across the
states. Id.
6 Abel, supra note 3, at 481.
7 Robert J. Steamer, Commerce Power, in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 167 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
s John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 511, 527 (2000) (describing the Madisonian Constitution as very much a part of the
liberal, free trade tradition).
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original debates, however, were restrictions on trade under the mercantilist tradition
that preceded free trade. It is often now stated that the major purpose of the
Constitution was to prevent protectionist economic policies among the states and to
establish a common market with free trade across state borders.9 Barriers on
interstate commerce, however, were not a notable issue in the original debates.
The Commerce Clause has evolved into a significantly greater and very different
power. Commentators now describe the Commerce Clause as "plenary"'" and as
"the single most important source of national power."" In the 1930's, the Supreme
Court turned from a narrow, restricting interpretation of "commerce" to a loose and
permissive interpretation, and in that debate, and its current reiterations, the
Commerce Clause has been treated as the broadest general power of the federal
government and the frontier most likely to mark the outer boundaries of federal
jurisdiction." The Founders did express the expectation that the new federal
government would be able to act within the appropriate national sphere, that is, that
it would provide for the "common Defense and general Welfare,"' 13 but very little
of that expectation falls under the original meaning of the Commerce Clause.
Given its modest original meaning, the modem importance of the Commerce
Clause comes, much like a panda's thumb, because of evolutionary growth. A
panda's thumb is not a thumb at all, but is rather a development from a once-tiny
wrist bone, which evolved over time into a sharp tool to strip bamboo. " Its humble
roots do not mean that it is illegitimate. Pandas do need their bamboo-stripping
9 See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
10 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK 105 (2d ed. 1979)
(quoting Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976)).
11 Steamer, supra note 7, at 167; accord SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 105 (stating that
the Commerce Clause is the "source of the most importantpowers that the Federal Government
exercises").
2 See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'3 "A Citizen of New York" [John Jay], Address to the People of the State of New York
(April 15, 1787), in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 111 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("[Tihe Convention concurred in opinion with the people that a
national government competent to every national object, was indispensably necessary.");
Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention, June 28, 1788, in 2
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 364 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (stating that
the division between federal and state governments is legislative, not constitutional, because
it would be too extensive and intricate to fix it in the Constitution and because changing
circumstances would make it necessary to change it). See Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious
Enumerated Power Doctrine, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the
constitutional text was intended to give Congress the power to legislate for the common
defense and general welfare by any tool).
"4 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL
HISTORY (1980).
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"thumbs" for survival. So similarly, the growth of the Commerce Clause was driven
by the "necessities of the union"' 5 and the demand for a federal government able to
serve the national needs. That the power to regulate commerce was once a
mercantilist clause, regulating commerce by restricting it, should not bother us very
much. We are no longer mercantilists. That the power to regulate commerce was
once a small and very different power does not mean that the modem Commerce
Clause is illegitimate. Evolution for survival is not an illegitimate process.
I. THE SAMPLE
If we want to understand historical texts, Quentin Skinner tells us, "we need to
make it one of our principal tasks to situate the texts we study within such
intellectual contexts as enable us to make sense of what their authors were doing in
writing them."' 6 The words of any historical document, including the Constitution,
are always actions, attempting to find allies to accomplish a program. To determine
the meaning of the words in strict historical context, one must strip away the cover
of words and look at the programs underneath.' 7 "Regulation of commerce" was
included in the Constitution to give the national government power to accomplish
specific programs. Words do have radiating ripples beyond the specific programs,
but the further we go from the rock of the programs, the less energy there is in the
ripples. Even to understand the penumbra of the words, one must first understand
the core programs. Once can also gain only limited understanding from reading a
historical text, over and over again, far removed from the context in which it was
written. To understand the historical meaning, we have to look, not for the con-
notations or abstractions of words in the twenty-first century, but for the programs
that gave the words their concrete meaning in 1787-1788."8
To determine what was meant by "regulation of commerce," this review collects
and categorizes 161 uses of the phrase "regulation of commerce" or the word
"commerce" in the debates over the adoption of the Constitution. One hundred
thirty-nine of those uses are associated with a specific goal or program and it is
those uses that form the 100% used as a baseline to measure the relative weight of
the programs, as percentages of sampled quotes. The samples come from both sides
5 Edmund Randolph, Draft of the Constitution IV, reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 142 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter
FARRAND'S RECORDS].
16 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 3 (2002).
"7 Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING
AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 57 (James Tully ed., 1988) (explaining
that "contextual reading" is a way to understand text).
18 Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, in ON LITERARY
INTENTION 210-21 (D. Newton de Molina ed., 1976), reprinted in MEANING AND CONTEXT:
QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS, supra note 17, at 55-65, 260.
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of the debate and the sampling was intended to be omnivorous.19
Usually the meaning of "regulation of commerce" comes as an unintended by-
product of the speaker's vigorous argument and usually the speakers do not seem
to be manipulating the meaning of "regulation of commerce" to stretch or contract
the definition of the phrase. One must generally be suspicious of speeches from
both sides of the ratification debates: the proponents of the Constitution understated
its meaning to encourage adoption and the opponents exaggerated its impact to
encourage defeat. When the definition of "commerce" was assumed as a side issue,
by contrast, the speaker seems to be manipulating the main argument to persuade but
not the side assumption, so that the definition of "commerce" in the side assumption
is more reliable.2°
The sampling did not pick up dictionary definitions. Dictionaries are, at best,
'9 As many of the cites as possible were picked up electronically by searching the follow-
ing web databases: PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrruTION
(1987), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2004);
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937), available
at http://memory.loc.gov/ammen/amlaw/lwfr.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004); THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2004); and THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrTUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
20 There is at least one exchange in which the debaters seem to spin the definition of
"regulation of commerce." On September 14, 1787 at the Philadelphia Convention, George
Mason was plausibly trying to move the definition of "regulation of commerce." James
Wilson had just said that "regulation of commerce" gives Congress the power to grant
monopolies and corporate charters. Mason opposed monopolies and said, I think insincerely,
they were not included in the power to regulate commerce. George Mason, Speech at the
Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 616. Mason, the next day, proposed an amendment to require a two-thirds majority for
Navigation Acts, to prevent Congress from giving shippers a monopoly that might allow
them to set their price for Southern crops and reduce their value by "perhaps 50 Per Ct," and
a Navigation Act that Mason opposed was a monopoly on shipping. Id. at 631. If Mason was
right on September 14 that regulation of commerce did not include navigation act
monopolies, he would not have needed the two-thirds restriction on the Navigation Act that
he proposed on September 15. Mason would later come to conclude that even as construed
by the proponents of the Constitution, Congress could "grant monopolies in trade and
commerce." George Mason, Objections of the Hon. George Mason to the Proposed Federal
Constitution, in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 496. Accord Elbridge Gerry, Speech
at the Federal Convention (King notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra
note 15, at 635 (objecting to the Constitution because it would "enable the legislature to
create corporations and monopolies"). Granting commercial monopolies and franchises
would have been an ordinary government instrument of the mercantilist times. See, e.g.,
Jacob Viner, Economic Thought: Mercantilist Thought, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 440 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (listing granting monopolies to
private companies as a typical tool of mercantilism).
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a sampling of usages from some other time or place. There is considerable danger
in using dictionary definitions to smuggle quotes out of context and from unrelated
controversies into the constitutional text. A dictionary definition seems like the best
way to infect the archeological site with artifacts from another place and time. Other
scholars have used dictionaries and collected uses quite far removed from the
constitutional debate.2' All of the samples here are from debates related broadly to
the formulation or adoption of the Constitution. The time span of the sampled quotes,
however, extends from descriptions of the problems that led to the Constitution long
before adoption and to recollections made long after the constitutional period of
what the issues were in the constitutional debates. On another day, the samples
might have been organized with different categories and some quotes might have
been put into different bins, but the quibbles at the margin do not materially lower
the validity of the conclusions.
The samples can be summarized quickly. In the constitutional debates, "regu-
lation of commerce" was most importantly a cover of words for the program of
nationalizing the state "imposts" or taxes on imports. Under the mercantilist
economics then dominant, any suppression of imports by tax or restriction would
preserve precious specie and serve the national welfare. Revenue was also critical
to the Founders to restore the public credit. "Regulation of commerce" was also
used as a reference for three restrictive mercantilist programs that never had enough
political strength behind them to be seriously considered: (1) an American
Navigation Act, giving Northern shippers a monopoly on the export of Southern
commodities, (2) a retaliatory impost against the British to induce the British to open
up the West Indies ports to American ships and (3) port preferences requiring that
all dealings with foreigners be conducted through preferred ports. None of the other
three programs - a monopoly for American shippers, a retaliatory impost against
the British, or port preferences - ever amounted to anything and indeed port
preferences were banned by the Philadelphia Convention itself. Finally, this review
shows that interstate commerce was not a material issue in the debates. The
Founders were concerned with fairness between the states, but the norm condemning
discrimination shows up almost exclusively outside of the Commerce Clause.
Interstate tolls were not a realistic threat and were not an issue in the debates.
The table immediately following summarizes the results of the sampling.
"Commerce" in the constitutional debates primarily referred, at 83% of the program-
"1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, 1 POLITIcS AND THE CONsTrUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 50-292 (1953) (citing English and American dictionaries, newspapers,
pamphlets, correspondences, treatises, legislative debates, and other historical records for the
proposition that "to regulate commerce" means to govern all gainful activity); WALTON H.
HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE CONSTITUTION -THEN AND
Now 42-63 (1972); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 14-21 (1999) (analyzing the meaning of the Commerce Clause
through a comparison of English and American usages).
[Vol. 13:1
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associated quotes, to Atlantic Ocean shipping. The most important issues within
"regulation of commerce" were tax issues: "to regulate commerce" meant "to tax it"
(27% of program-associated quotes). The remainder of the actively-proposed
programs under "regulation of commerce," besides tax, were restrictions on foreign
trade. Proponents of the Constitution advocated retaliatory tariffs against the British
as punishment for excluding American ships from the British West Indies (28%) and
they advocated giving American ships a monopoly on the export of American
commodities (22%). None of the mercantile restrictions amounted to much,
however, even after the Constitution was ratified. "Commerce" was also used as a
justification for restrictions on the states to protect out-of-state citizens (17%), but
the remedies were specified outside of the Commerce Clause. The language of the
Commerce Clause also covers trade with the Indians and commerce among the
states, but there were no active debates or proposals in the 161 samples under either
trade with the Indians or among the states.
SAMPLE OF 161 CITES FOR "COMMERCE" CATEGORIZED:
Percent of references to
programs (143 total)
1. Deep-water shipping 115 83%
a. Regulation of commerce 37 27%
means taxation
b. Retribution to open foreign 39 28%
ports
c. Restrictions on U.S. ports 30 22%
d. Other foreign shipping 9
2. U.S. Border Land Issues 1 1 1%
3. Equity between States 23 17%
a. Interstate Commerce 13 9%
b. Fairness of one state to 10
another reflected in other clauses
Sum of reference to programs 139 100%
4. Words without Controversies 22
a. Commerce apart from 16
manufacture and agriculture
b. Too vague to categorize 6
2004]
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11. DEEP WATER SHIPPING
For 83% of the cites, "regulation of commerce" relates to Atlantic Ocean
shipping. Gordon Wood has argued that in the eighteenth century "commerce"
usually referred to international trade2 2 and the sample confirms that description.
The four most important programs mentioned in the constitutional debates related
to international trade: (1) nationalization of the state imposts, (2) retaliation against
the British for restrictions on West Indies shipping; (3) port preferences, and (4) an
American Navigation Act. All were all deep-water shipping issues and within the
then-dominant economic philosophy of mercantilism.
A. The Impost
The most important "commerce" issue in the ratification debate was the
nationalization of state imposts. The core grievance was the 22% impost that the
state of New York imposed on imports coming in through New York harbor.2 3 For
thirty-four cites, "regulation of commerce" meant taxing commerce.24 The
22 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 316 (1992).
Wood argues that "commerce" did not begin to refer to domestic trade until the nineteenth
century, which is beyond the borders of the time period sampled here.
23 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 18, 1784, 8th Sess., ch. 7, reprinted in 2 LAWS OFTHESTATE OF
NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE 11-12 (Weed Parsons 1886)
[hereinafter 2 LAWS OF NEW YORK] (stating that the 21/2% rate was the default rate; for listed
goods such as Madeira wine, a specific amount was set per case in shillings or pence).
24 (1) David Ramsay (S.C.), Speech to the Continental Congress (Jan. 27, 1783), in 25
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1784-1789, at 869 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922)
[hereinafter 25 JOURNALS] (saying that states could not pay the revolutionary debts because
"rivalships relative to trade ... impede a regular impost"); (2) Committee of James Madison
et al., Address to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled (Apr. 26, 1783), in
24 JOURNALS 278 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) [hereinafter 24 JOURNALS] (advocating state
ratification of 5% federal impost to pay the debts of the Revolutionary War because impost
cannot be used without concerted uniformity, properly achieved through Congress, because
of the position of more commercial states); (3) REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (James Monroe et al.) (July 13, 1785), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 13, at Ill (reporting a proposal to allow Congress to lay such imposts
and duties on imports and exports as may be necessary to regulate the trade of the states with
both foreign nations and with each other); (4) Letter from Edmund Carrington to Gov.
Edmund Randolph (Apr. 2, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 362 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter 9 MADISON PAPERS] (arguing that only a federal head
with full authority over commerce could prevent states from destroying a source of revenue
that might be immensely valuable to the Union); (5) "Z," PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., May 16,
1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 99 ("It has been seen that
the States individually cannot, with any success, pretend to regulate trade. The duties and
restrictions which one State imposes, the neighbouring States enable the merchants to
elude .... ");(6) Edmund Randolph, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes,
[Vol. 13:1
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May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 19 (saying that there were many
advantages which the United States could not attain under the Confederation, "such as a
productive impost - counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations -
pushing of commerce ad libitum"); (7) Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention
(King notes, June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 143 (referring to
"powers to regulate com[m]erce & draw therefrom a revenue"); (8) Nathaniel Gorham,
Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, July 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 90 (saying that New York is very attached to her present
advantage "of taxing her neighbour[]s by the regulation of her trade"); (9) Philip A. Crowl,
Charles Carroll's Plan of Government, 46 AM HIST. REV. 588, 591 (1941) (outlining
Carroll's July 23, 1787 plan to revise the Articles of Confederation, which asserts that
Congress needs exclusive power over regulation of trade by duties on trade because
uniformity in duties on imports from foreign countries is necessary for the effectual,
nonoppressive collection of the duties); (10) Report of the Committee of Detail, IV (Edmund
Randolph et al.) (July 23, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 143
(categorizing the "regulat[ion of] commerce[] both foreign and domestic" as the fifth
restriction to the argument for curtailing the unlimited congressional power to tax exports);
(11) James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 16, 1787), in 3
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 307 (dwelling on the injustice of leaving "N[ew]
Jersey [and] Connecticut ...any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial
neighbours") (emphasis added); (12) John Mercer (Md.), Speech at the Federal Convention
(Madison notes, Aug. 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 307 (opposing
giving Congress power to tax exports because at the time states could "tax both imports and
exports of their uncommercial neighbours" and "[i]t was enough for them to sacrifice one
half of it") (emphasis added); (13) Chesterfield Town [Mass.] Meeting Instructions to
Representative (Oct. 9, 1787), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY supra note 13, at 60 (calling
for additional imposts on importations of foreign articles, to prevent transfer of wealth from
western Massachusetts to pay New York imposts); (14) Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 MADISON PAPERS 211 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1977) [hereinafter 10 MADISON PAPERS] (arguing that there was no definable distinction
between the power of regulating trade and that of drawing revenue from it); (15) THE
FEDERALIST No. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (citing as a need
for the Constitution, the opportunities which some states including New York "have of
rendering others tributary to them, by commercial regulations"); (16) Hugh Williamson's
Speech at Edenton, North Carolina (Nov. 8, 1787), in DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.) Feb 25-27,
1788 [hereinafter Williamson Speech at Edenton], reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 231 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION] (saying that by imposts and other regulations of
commerce, it will be in the power of government to collect a vast revenue for the general
benefit of the nation); (17) THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (stating that a general union will be conducive to the interests of commerce
and extend the revenue to be drawn from it); (18) James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 141
("Devoid of power, we could neither prevent the excessive importations which lately deluged
the country, nor even raise from that excess a contribution to the public revenue .. "); (19)
THE FEDERALIST No. 12, supra, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The single article of ardent
20041
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spirits, under [flederal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue.")
(emphasis added); (20) "One of the Middle-Interest," MASS. CENTINEL, Dec. 5, 1787,
reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 387.
For if one State makes a law to prohibit foreign goods of any kind, or
to draw a revenue, from any imposition upon such goods, another State
is sure to take the advantage, and to admit such goods free of costs. By
this means it is well known how the trade of Massachusetts is gone to
Connecticut, and that for want of a revenue, our own State taxes are
increased.
Id. (21) "Landholder IX," CONN. COURANT, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 192 (stating that New York impost draws 40,000 pounds from
Connecticut and ruins the State's foreign trade); (22) Charles Pinckney, Speech at the South
Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13,
at 253 (saying that loss of credit and inability in our citizens to pay taxes were the result of
the destruction of our commerce, caused by other nations' restrictions that the general
government could not counteract); (23) Rawlins Lowndes, Debate in the South Carolina
Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 22 (saying that
Congress by the 1783 impost proposal asked for the power to regulate commerce for only
a limited time and opposing the Constitution because it gave Congress the power "to regulate
commerce ad infinitum"); (24) Thomas Dawes, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification
Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 57 (saying that state
imposts drive the trade to neighboring states making the states rely on taxes on land to satisfy
requisitions, and objecting to different systems of duties in different states); (25) THE
FEDERALIST No. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating that the
object of the power of regulating commerce was the "relief of the States which import and
export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter");
(26) THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 302 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating
that the prohibition of state taxes on imports and exports is proven by the necessity of
submitting the regulation of trade to the federal government); (27) Charles Pinckney, Speech
at the House of Representatives 16th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 14, 1820), in 36 ANNALS OFTHE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (Joseph Gales ed., 1855) 1317-18 [hereinafter 36
ANNALS OF CONGRESS] (arguing that Congress could not prohibit movement of slaves to
territories because power over interstate commerce by water between the states was given
to prevent port preferences and the obligations of paying duties on commerce to another
state); (28) "A Farmer," PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Apr. 23, 1788, reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 139 (stating that the "power of regulating commerce.. . ought
to belong to the general government, and that the burden of debt incurred by the revolution
[has] rendered a general revenue necessary," so that imposts upon importations present
themselves, not only as a source of revenue, but as revenue for which the governments of the
particular states are incompetent); (29) "A Plebian," An Address to the People of New York
(Apr. 17, 1788), reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 146 (supporting
the granting to the general government the power to regulate trade and lay imposts for that
purpose, as well as raising revenue, but stating that the hopes from the change will never be
realized because the country buys more than it sells and because there are too many
merchants); (30) To Be or Not to Be? Is the Question, N.H. GAZETTE (Portsmouth), Apr. 18,
1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 404 ("An increased revenue,
from a proper and universal regulation of trade, will render needless so large a dry tax as we
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major program was to federalize the New York and other state imposts and use them
to pay the debts from the Revolutionary War. Closely related is the Constitution's
prohibition on states laying taxes on exports, again to prevent the "commercial
states" with deep-water harbors from abusing their uncommercial neighbors by
taxing shipments of goods produced by their neighbors for export (three cites).25
In 1783 Congress proposed to the states that it be granted the power to lay a
federal impost of 5% of imports, so as to have a source of revenue to make
payments on the debts of the Revolutionary War.26 The Articles of Confederation
had allowed the federal government to collect revenue only by requisitions.2 7 The
Articles also required that an amendment to give the federal government the power
to tax directly would require unanimous ratification by all the states.28 New York
vetoed the 1783 proposal to allow a federal impost. New York's motivation was to
retain the revenue from the New York harbor impost for exclusive New York
have been subject to."); (31) Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 18,
1828), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 477 (stating that the encouragement of
manufacturing was an object of the power to regulate trade, as indicated that Framers and
Anti-Federalists in the first Congress had proposed duties and even prohibitions of articles
that competed with domestic production); (32) Letter from James Madison to Joseph C.
Cabell (Feb. 18, 1828), in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrruTION 517 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lemer eds., 1987) (writing that the power to lay imposts is included in the power to regulate
trade, even though tax is expressed separately); (33) Letter from James Madison to Joseph
C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 478 (stating that
federal power over interstate commerce "grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing
States in taxing the non-importing"); (34) James Madison, Preface To Debates in the
Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 547 (observing
that lack of a general congressional power to regulate commerce led to an exercise of this
power separately by the States and engendered undercutting rivalry and "vain attempts to
supply their respective treasuries by imposts").
25 (1) James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 21, 1787), in 5 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 13, at 455 (saying that to deny the federal government the power to tax
exports "is to take from the common government half the regulation of trade"); (2) Roger
Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 16,1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 308 (supporting a prohibition of tax on exports, but saying that
the "oppression of the uncommercial States [by commercial states] was guarded [against] by
the power to regulate trade between the States"); (3) Gouverneur Morris, Speech at the
Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 21, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 360 (arguing that without prohibition, "exporting States will tax the produce of their
uncommercial neighbours").
26 24 JOURNALS, supra note 24, at 358.
27 See ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1993).
28 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII (U.S. 1781) (requisitions); id. at art. XIII (re-
quiring unanimous confirmation by each state).
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needs.2 9 Under the requirement of the Articles of Confederation for unanimous
confirmation by all the states, New York's vote was sufficient to veto the federal
impost.3° Madison later wrote that New York refused the 5% impost "for the urgent
debt of the Revolution," just so as to "tax[] the consumption of her neighbours."'"
When New York vetoed the 1783 impost, it was said, every "liberal good man
[wished] New York in Hell." 32
New York was expected to repeat its veto of nationalization of the impost if
again given the chance. New York was too much attached to "taxing her neighbours
[]by the regulation of her trade."33 "Much opposition is expected in New-York,"
Timothy Pickering wrote home.3
That state has long been acting a disingenuous part. They
refused the impost to Congress - because half of New-Jersey,
a great part of Connecticut, the western part of Massachusetts,
[and] Vermont, received their imported goods thro[ugh] New-
York, who put into her own treasury all the duties arising on the
goods consumed in [these] states.35
Connecticut and New Jersey were outraged by the New York impost.36 In
Connecticut, the proponents of the Constitution warned that those "gentlemen in
New-York who receive large salaries . . . know that their offices will be more
insecure.., when the expen[s]es of government shall be paid by their constituents,
29 JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC
89-96 (1993). New York, in form, merely set new conditions on approval, including a New
York state officer being appointed to collect the revenue and New York paper money being
accepted for the tax, but the conditions were understood on both sides to be tantamount to
veto. New York paper would not help pay Dutch or French or Pennsylvania creditors.
30 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XII (U.S. 1781), reprinted in 19 JOURNALS 221
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912) [hereinafter 19 JOURNALS].
"' Unsent letter from James Madison to John Tyler (1833), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 530-31.
32 Letter from Henry Jackson to Henry Knox (Apr. 23, 1786), quoted in Robert A. Freer,
Shay'sRebellion andthe Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEWENG.Q. 388,390 (1969).
13 .Nathaniel Gorham, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, July 23, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 90.
" Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Pickering (Dec. 29, 1787), in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 177.
'5 See id.
36 See, e.g., Oliver Ellsworth, Speech at the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 192 (saying that "the people of Connecticut,
pay annually into the treasury of New York more than fifty thousand dollars" by reason of
the impost on New York harbor traffic).
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than while paid by us." 37 The New York impost undermined requisitions as well.
New Jersey repudiated the 1786 requisition based on the argument that New Jersey
had paid enough tax already because it received its imports through New York and
Philadelphia.38 New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was "a
Cask tapped at both ends. '39 New Jersey and Connecticut ratified the Constitution
quickly and overwhelmingly to nationalize the New York harbor taxes.'
Rhode Island shared New York's villainy. Rhode Island had vetoed a similar
proposal in 1781 to give Congress a 5% impost.41 "Rhode Island, as a weak State,"
Madison told Congress in 1783, is against the "General revenue as tending... to
deprive her of the advantage afforded by her situation of taxing the commerce of
the contiguous States."4 2 When Rhode Island vetoed the impost, Rhode Island
thereafter became the "evil genius" whose veto "injured the United States more than
the worth of that whole state. 43 Rhode Island was "shameful" and this "perverse
sister,"44 this "[clursed State, ought to be erased out of the Confederation, and...
out of the earth, if any worse place could be found for them. '45
17 Editorial, CONN. COURANT (Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 82.
18 Votes and Proceeding of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey 12, Sess.
10, 2d sitting (1786). See RUTH BOGIN, ABRAHAM CLARK AND THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY
IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 1774-1794, at 127-31 (1982).
" James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 542.
40 FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 126, 139 (1958) (attributing the quick and overwhelming ratification of the
Constitution by Connecticut and New Jersey to the New York harbor impost controversy).
Accord James Madison, Notes to a Speech to the Continental Congress (Feb. 26, 1783), in
25 JOURNALS, supra note 24, at 914 n.2 (arguing that both Connecticut and New Jersey
favored general revenue to protect their commerce from New York tax).
" Letter from the Rhode Island Speaker of the Assembly (Nov. 30, 1782), in 23
JOURNALS 788-89 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914) (announcing that Rhode Island refused the 1781
impost because the impost would be hardest on commercial states, would introduce foreign
collectors into Rhode Island and would give Congress funding independent of its constit-
uents).
42 James Madison, Notes to a Speech to the Continental Congress (Feb. 26, 1783), in 25
JOURNALS, supra note 24, at 914 n.2. Accord Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the Continental
Congress (Madison notes, Feb. 13, 1783), in 25 JOURNALS, supra note 24, at 902 ("[T]he true
objection on the part of R[hode] I[sland] was the interference of the impost with the oppor-
tunity afforded by their situation of levying contributions on Con[necticut., [etc.], which
rec[eive]d[] foreign supplies through the ports of R[hode] I[sland].").
43 IRVIN H. POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION, 1774-1795, at 96 (1969)
(quoting ST. GAZETTE S.C. (Charleston), June 1, 1786, and "A Fable," EXCHANGE ADVISER
(Boston), Feb. 11, 1786).
4 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 19, 1783), in 5 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 288 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
"5 Letter from John Montgomery to Edward Hand (July 26, 1784), in 7 LETrERS OF
MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 575 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1934).
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The Founders also generalized their condemnation beyond New York and Rhode
Island. In North Carolina, Hugh Williamson called for ratification of the Consti-
tution to end the Virginia and South Carolina taxes on goods imported into North
Carolina. 46 "Publius" said that the object of the Constitution's giving Congress the
power to regulate commerce was relief for the "[sitates which import and export
through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter.
47
Publius also said that under the Articles some states have the opportunity of render-
ing others "tributary" to them by laying duties on her importations.4' Hamilton, in
his own exposed public role, argued that "uncommercial" states would never be able
to bear the quota assigned under the ordinary rules of apportioning requisitions
because they had borne imposts as well.49 The uncommercial states would fail in
paying their quota, Hamilton argued, their example would be followed, and the
Union would then inevitably dissolve.5" For the Federalists, the state imposts levied
by states with good harbors was a prime example of an immoral state willing to
abuse its neighbors.
Revenue from foreign imports also required a uniform policy along the whole
coast. If one state tried to raise rates, a neighboring state would destroy the revenue
by undercutting the tax rates to channel commerce in her direction. Only the
"[federal] Head with full Authority [could prevent] State Schemes ... pursued with
Surreptitious views against each other, which must eventually destroy a source of
Revenue that might be immensely valuable to the whole Union."51 Hamilton argued
that imposts by the individual states would be difficult to enforce because the bays,
rivers and long borders between the states made smuggling too easy. On the federal
level, however, there was only one side to guard - the Atlantic.52 The general
government would regulate commerce with a uniform impost and so make
commerce productive of general revenue.53
46 Williamson Speech at Edenton, supra note 24, at 227.
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 24, at 283 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
48 THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 24, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton).
49 Alexander Hamilton, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, June 18,
1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 286.
o See id.
5' Letter from Edmund Carrington to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 2, 1787) in 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 24, at 362.
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 12, supra note 24, at 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
5 See, e.g., Crowl, supra note 24, at 591 (stating that Congress needs exclusive power
over regulation of trade by duties on trade because uniformity in duties on imports from
foreign countries is necessary to effectual, nonoppressive collection of the duties); "One of
the Middle-Interest," MASS. CENTINEL, Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 387:
For if one State makes a law to prohibit foreign goods of any kind, or
to draw a revenue, from an imposition upon such goods, another State
is sure to take the advantage, and to admit such goods free of costs. By
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The revenue aspects of the imposts were very important to the adoption of the
Constitution, but the equity aspects of the fight over the New York impost is
probably properly viewed, as Merrill Jensen put it, as a "teapot tempest. '54 The New
York tax at 212% was probably not even worth smuggling around. The New York
deep-water harbor and established docks were probably worth many times that 2 2%
amount. It was hard to unload a deep water ship without a deep water harbor.55
From 1784 through 1787 New York exempted from its impost goods held for
re-export, provided they were kept in their original package. 6 To the extent that
New York was acting as a wholesaler or middleman, breaking up and distributing
imported goods for the Vermont, New Jersey and Connecticut countryside, the
"original package" requirement would have prevented the exemption from applying.
The exemption was narrowed dramatically, however, in April 1787 to apply only
if the goods were not landed in New York. The captain of the ship had to take an
oath that the exempted goods were not intended to be landed or put on shore in New
York nor brought back into New York. After April 1787, importers could not use
this means it is well known how the trade of Massachusetts is gone to
Connecticut, and that for want of a revenue, our own State taxes are
increased.
See also Thomas Dawes, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 57-58 (arguing that state imposts drive the
trade to neighboring states); "Z," PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., May 16, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 98-99 ("It has been long seen that the States
individually cannot, with any success, pretend to regulate trade. The duties and restrictions
which one State imposes, the neighbouring States enable the merchants to elude. .. ");
James Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 547 (stating that lack of a general congressional power to
regulate commerce led to an exercise of this power separately by the States, engendered
undercutting rivalry and "vain attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts").
14 MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 339 (1950). Merrill Jensen is a historian with not much
sympathy for the Federalist proponents of the Constitution, and his characterization can be
understood as a jab at the Framers, but no jab at the Framers is intended here in agreeing with
Jensen's conclusion as to the importance of the New York impost.
" Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973) [hereinafter 8
MADISON PAPERS] (complaining that prices on Baltimore and Philadelphia docks for Virginia
exports were 15-20% higher than on Virginia rivers). If we attribute the higher prices entirely
to the advantage of good deep water docks versus shallow river docks, then the value of deep
water facilities would be six to eight times what New York was charging in tax for their use.
56 Act of Nov. 18, 1784, 8th Sess., ch. 7, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note
23, at 14; Act of Apr. 11, 1787, 10th Sess., ch. 81, reprinted in 2 LAWS OFNEW YORK, supra
note 23, at 513. South Carolina, Massachusetts and Virginia had similar exemptions for re-
exports kept in the original package. See also Edward Kitch, Regulation and the American
Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 17-19 (A.
Dan Tarlock ed., 1981).
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the New York harbor wharves to ship through New York in the original package
without paying the 22% tax. 7 In any event, the considerable non-tax advantages
of using New York harbor and docks to land cargo and break up the package probably
meant the exemption was not much used. New York's neighbors complained about
the 2 % tax, but they got enough value out of the harbor and docks to pay it.
Federalizing the imposts was the feature of the Commerce Clause generating
almost universal assent, outside of New York and Rhode Island.58 The "impost" was
the least objectionable federal tax because it could be collected without interfering
with the "internal police" of the states.5 9 It had been approved by the overwhelming
majority of the states in 1781 and 1783, defeated by selfish New York in 1783, and
"obdurate" Rhode Island in 1781 . The Anti-Federalists, while opposing the power
of Congress to lay general internal or dry-land taxes except by requisition upon the
states, nonetheless generally conceded that Congress could be given the power to
lay "external taxes" by the impost.
61
57 2 LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 23, at 513-14. In the 1784 version, a shipper had
sixty days to re-export goods after a landing. Id. at 14.
5 Abel, supra note 3, at 446-51.
9 Oliver Ellsworth, Speech at the Connecticut Convention on Ratification (Jan. 7, 1788),
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 550.
6 After Rhode Island vetoed the 1781 impost proposal, Virginia withdrew her prior
ratification on the ground that a federal tax was inconsistent with Virginia sovereignty. 11
STATUTES OF VIRGINIA AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS 171 (William
Waller Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter STATUTES OF VIRGINIA]. Madison was appalled. See
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Jan. 22, 1783), in 6 THEPAPERS OFJAMES
MADISON 55-56 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969) ("Virginia
could never have cut off this source of public relief at a more unlucky crises."). New York
and Rhode Island, however, bore the brunt of the angry rhetoric.
61 "Federal Farmer," Letters to the Republican, N.Y.J., Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 30, 35-36 (stating that impost may be collected
by a few officers in seaport towns, but opposing internal taxes); "Cato Uticensis," To the
Freemen of Virginia, VA. INDEP. CHRON. Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 73 (opposing conceding imposts and requisitions if imposts are
not sufficient); "An Old Whig," Letter VI, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 24,1787, reprint-
ed in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 218 ("Without the power of imposing
duties on foreign commerce and regulating trade, the United States will be weak and
contemptible .. "); "Brutus V," N.Y.J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 426-27 (stating that impost duties are proper and "should be laid
by the general government"); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 2,
1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 332 ("[T]he power of taxing any
thing but imports appears to be the most popular topic among the adversaries."). Two
examples of Anti-Federalist opposition to a federal impost are: James Wadsworth, Speech
at the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13,
at 274 (arguing that impost is not a proper mode of taxation); John Smilie, Debate at the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 408-09 (saying if "they have unlimited power to drain the wealth of the people,
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The important aspect of the controversy over New York impost was that the
revenue was needed to pay off the Revolutionary War debts, and not just for New
York State needs. It was known that when the Constitution was ratified, Congress
planned to impose the 5% federal impost, denied to it by the one-state veto rule in
1781 and 1783. "[Wlas it not an acknowledged object of the Convention," Madison
asked, "and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade
should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an
immediate source of general revenue? ' 6 2 New York Governor George Clinton was
said, as the ratification debate got serious, to have offered New Jersey to give up the
impost and refund collections if New Jersey would just refuse to ratify the
Constitution. 63 New York's giving revenue to New Jersey, however, would not have
improved the fiscal health of the federal government.
The unfairness arguments seem to be just rhetorical make-weights, almost a
sweetener to convince Connecticut and New Jersey to support the federal fiscal
needs. When the Constitution became final, Connecticut and New Jersey could ex-
pect a doubling of the then current 2 /% impost on New York shipping up to the
federal 5% and there would be no possibility of exemption from the new doubled
rate impost for goods not landed or broken down in New York harbor.
The controversy over nationalizing the New York and other state imposts was
commonly called a "regulation of commerce" issue in the debates over the
Constitution. "Regulation of commerce" was often a synonym for taxation of
commerce.6 In modem usage, however, the impost is better called a revenue issue.
Section 8 of Article 1 also gives Congress the power to raise taxes on its own,
including imposts, and Section 10 prohibits state imposts. Thus the revenue issues
were adequately covered elsewhere and did not need the Commerce Clause.
whether by imposts or by direct levies," then the "system must be too formidable" for states
to break) (emphasis added).
62 THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 262 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
63 "A Freeholder," BRUNSWICK GAZETrE, Feb. 10, 1789, cited in KAMINSKI, supra note
29, at 136 (stating that Abraham Clark had thought New Jersey had ratified too precipitously
and that New York would have made concessions including giving up the impost and
refunding prior collections if New Jersey had declined); PA. J., Dec. 19, 1787, quoted in
KAMINSKI, supra note 29, at 136 (reporting that Clinton tried to defeat the Constitution by
"negotiat[ing] 'thro[ugh] a person of considerable weight in Jersey' (probably Abraham
Clark), to return half of New York's state impost to New Jersey if the state refused to adopt
the Constitution").
64 Of the sample of thirty-seven quotes on regulation of commerce referencing the
federalizing impost, nine used "regulation of commerce" as a synonym for taxation. See
supra note 24.
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B. Retaliation Against the British
For thirty-nine (28%) of the cites in the sample, "regulation of commerce" is a
reference to attempts to open up foreign ports to U.S.-owned ships by imposing a
retaliatory impost or embargo on foreign ships coming into American ports.65 The
65 (1) REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Elbridge Gerry et al.)
(Apr. 26, 1784), reprinted in 26 JOURNALS 319 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928) (proposing that the
legislatures of the States give Congress the power for fifteen years to prohibit imports in a
ship of a country without a commercial treaty with the United States); (2) Letter from James
Monroe to James Madison (July 26, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 329
(observing that Congress had proposed to grant itself the power to regulate commerce so to
obtain reciprocity from other nations); (3) Letter from James Madison to James Monroe
(Aug. 7, 1785), 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 334-35 ("Should G[reat] B[ritian]
persist in the machinations which distress us, and seven or eight of the States be hindered by
the others from obtaining relief by federal means . . . I tremble at the anti-federal
experiments into which the former may be tempted."); (4) Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 344 ("[If any
thing should reconcile Virg[ini]a to the idea of giving Cong[ress] a power over her trade, it
will be that this power is likely to annoy Great Br[itian] against whom the animosities of our
Citizens are still strong."); (5) James Madison, Motion in the Virginia House of Delegates
(Nov. 30, 1785), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 114 (proposing to allow Congress
to embargo or tax any foreign vessel to obtain privileges in foreign ports for U.S. vessels);
(6) Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 502 (observing that if the Annapolis Convention should come to nothing,
it will "confirm G[reat] B[ritian] and all the world in the belief that we are not to be
respected, nor apprehended as a nation in matters of Commerce"); (7) Edmund Randolph,
Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 19 (saying that among the advantages that the United States
might acquire are "counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations - pushing
of commerce ad libitum - [etc.]"); (8) David Ramsay, Oration, CHARLESTON COLUMBIAN
HERALD, June 5, 1787, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 163 ("Our
protected commerce will open new channels for our native commodities, and give additional
value to the soil, by increasing the demand for its productions."); (9) Letter from Philippe
Andre' Joseph de Idtombe to Comte de ]a Luzeme (June 26, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 197 (foreseeing that adoption of the Constitution will unite the
states and facilitate the desirable reciprocity of commerce between the United States and
France); (10) Anonymous [Alexander Hamilton], DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), July 21, 1787,
in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 12 (defending the Philadelphia convention as necessitated by
"the stagnation of commerce occasioned to aj ust degree by the exclusions and restraints with
which foreign nations fetter our trade with them"); (11) Letter from James Bowdoin to
George Erving (Aug. 12, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 324 (Great
Britain's system of commerce will be altered when "Congress, under [the] new Constitution
will have the power of regulating it within [the] Ports of [the] United States."); (12) John
Rutledge, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 452 (arguing that gaining access to the West Indies
is the "great object" of regulating commerce); (13) Letter from Andrew Allen to Tench Coxe
(Sept. 8, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 361-62 (arguing that
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advocates of the Constitution are too sanguine in assuming adoption will immediately
"extend[] Commerce or open new Channels of Trade"); (14) Social Compact, NEW HAVEN
GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 356
(regretting the "begging situation to which our commerce is reduced in every part of the
globe," the heavy duties and the exclusions from British ports); (15) "Marcus," DAILY
ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Oct. 15, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 24, at 127 (arguing that when commerce is a national object, nations will form treaties
with us); (16) "A Landholder I," CONN. COURANT, Nov. 5-12, 1787, reprinted in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 399-400 (arguing that until the Constitution is
effected, our commerce may be "insulted by every overgrown merchant in Europe"); (17)
THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 66-67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(advocating a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain from all ports);
(18) James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 24, 1787),
in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 360 (observing that being devoid of
importance, we were unable to command a sale for commodities in foreign markets); (19)
"A Landholder V," CONN. COURANT, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 480 (threatening that without the Constitution "your commerce,
the price of your commodities, your riches, and your safety will be the sport of every foreign
adventurer"); (20) "Candidus I," INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 128 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("Those nations laid these
duties to promote their own fishery, [etc.] and ... will pursue their own politicks respecting
our imports and exports, unless we can check them by some commercial regulations."); (21)
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 135-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ('The
want of a power to regulate commerce ... operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial
treaties with foreign powers .... ); (22) "One of the Middle-Interest," MASS. CENTINEL,
Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 387 ("Congress has
no power to withhold some advantages from foreigners, in order to obtain other advantages
from them."); (23) The Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, PA. PACKET,
Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 14 (regretting that
"we were suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations, who had shackled our commerce,
while we were unable to retaliate"); (24) "Centinel VI," PA. PACKET, Dec. 25, 1787,
reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 99 (finding "considerable benefit
[in] strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to enable them to regulate commerce and
counteract the adverse restrictions of other nations"); (25) Edmund Randolph, Reasons for
Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13,
at 265 (arguing that the states cannot organize retaliation against foreign nations and what
is needed is "exclusion... opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction"); (26) Charles
Pinckney, Speech at the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 253 (asserting that the first great inconvenience of the
Confederation was the "destruction of our commerce, occasioned by the restrictions of other
nations, whose policy it was not in the power of the general government to counteract"); (27)
Edward Rutledge, Speech to the South Carolina Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 23 (asking, "could [the Articles] obtain security for our
commerce in any part of the world?"); (28) James Bowdoin, Speech at the Massachusetts
Ratification Convention (Jan. 23, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 83
(observing that trade is in a miserable state because "other nations prohibit our vessels from
entering their ports, or lay heavy duties on our exports," and we cannot prevent it because
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core grievance was that Great Britain, under the British Navigation Act, granted a
monopoly to its own vessels for entry into its West Indies possessions in an attempt
to capture the profits of shipping for its own nationals. Great Britain also wanted
to stimulate a strong merchant fleet that could train British seamen for the Navy and
Congress has "no retaliating or regulating power over their vessels and exports"); (29)
Nathaniel Gorham, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 25, 1788), 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 106 (saying that Great Britain "prohibit[s] our oil, fish,
lumber, [etc.] from being imported into their territories, in order to favor Nova Scotia, for
they know we cannot make general retaliating laws"); (30) Letter from Gaspard Joseph
Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 13 (reporting that "the navigation acts of the states of New[ Hlampshire and
[M]assachusetts had been suspended because the other states did not wish to proclaim similar
ones, designed to punish [E]ngland for its strictness against [A]merican commerce"); (31)
Jonathan Williams, Jr., The Fabrick of Freedom, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 1788,
reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 361 (expressing in part, "See
Commerce with extended hand/ Flies the restraint of kings/ And foreign riches to this land/
From ev'ry climate brings/"); (32) JOHN JAY, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 67, 73 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) [hereinafter PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION] (warning that "other nations taking the advantage of [our] imbecility, are
daily multiplying commercial restraints upon us" and that there is not one English, French
or Spanish "island or port in the West-Indies to which an American vessel can carry a cargo
of flour for sale"); (33) To Be or Not To Be? Is the Question, N.H. GAZETrE (Portsmouth),
Apr. 16, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 407 (stating
that the "inconvenience [that] foreign powers must suffer from a proper regulation of
commerce by Congress, will oblige them" to open ports); (34) Letter from Comte de
Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (May 29, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 145 (arguing that Americans are indignant and that John Adams failed to get
treaty of commerce so that their flag is excluded from trading in the West Indies); (35) James
Monroe, Speech at the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 13, at 213 (Anti-Federalist saying that commercial treaties would be
no advantage because there is no probability of opening the West or East Indies to U.S.
ships); (36) Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (June 18, 1788), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 184 (referring to time "when foreign nations
shall be disposed to give us equal advantages in commerce from dread of retaliation"); (37)
N.J. J., June 18, 1788, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 185
(envisioning that "[t]he moment the English know we can retaliate, that moment they will
relax in their restrictions on our commerce - and that moment will never arrive until our
union is consolidated"); (38) William R. Davie, Speech at the North Carolina Ratification
Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 18 ("The United
States should be empowered to compel foreign nations into commercial regulations," and
counter British insults.); (39) James Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of1787
(c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 547 (describing the reasons for the
Constitution to include "the want of auth[orit]y[] in Cong[res]s to regulate [c]ommerce,
[which] had produced in Foreign nations particularly G[reat] B [ritian] a monopolizing policy
injurious to the trade of the U.S. and destructive to their navigation").
[Vol. 13:1
PANDA'S THUMB
could serve as auxiliary vessels in war. When the American states were still colonies,
the purpose of giving incentives to British shipping included especially stimulating
American shipping, and there was a very active trade between the West Indies and
American ports. When America achieved independence, however, Britain decided
that there was no reason to let American vessels into its West Indian ports.'
The grievance, however, was generalized to include the power to retaliate
against France and Spain for similar exclusions. All great trading nations were said
to have tried "to secure to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade. 67 John
Jay complained that because of our "imbecility," all the empires were imposing
"commercial restraints upon us" so that there is not one English, French or Spanish
"island or port in the West-Indies, to which an American vessel can carry a cargo
of flour for sale."68 Without a Constitution, proponents argued, our commerce
would be "insulted by every overgrown merchant in Europe' 69 and "your commerce,
the price of your commodities, your riches, and your safety will be the sport of
every foreign adventurer."7 Britain's system of commerce will be altered, former
Massachusetts Governor James Bowdoin wrote to George Erving, only when
"Congress, under [the] new Constitution will have the power of regulating it within
[the] Ports of [the] United States."'" What was needed, said Edmund Randolph, was
"exclusion... opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction. '72 Even the threat
of retaliation, Washington wrote, would induce foreign powers to give the United
States beneficial commercial treaties.73
66 LORD SHEFFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
EUROPE AND THE WEST-INDIES 264-65 (6th ed. 1784), described in CROWLEY, supra note
2, at 81-83, and STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 69 (1993).
67 Thomas Russell, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788),
in 2 ELIUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 139.
68 JOHN JAY, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Sept. 17, 1787),
reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 65, at 73.
69 "A Landholder I," CONN. COURANT, Nov. 5-12, 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 399-400.
70 "A Landholder V," CONN. COURANT, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 480.
7' Letter from James Bowdoin to George Erving (Aug. 12, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 324.
7' Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 265.
7' Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (June 18, 1788), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 184 (imagining the time "when foreign nations
shall be disposed to give us equal advantages in commerce from dread of retaliation"); Letter
from Philippe Andre Joseph de Ltombe to Comte de la Luzeme (June 26, 1787), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 197 (predicting that adoption of the Constitution
will unite the states and facilitate the desirable reciprocity of commerce between the United
States and France); "Marcus," DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Oct. 15, 1787, reprinted in 1
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 127 (arguing that when commerce is a
national object, nations will form treaties with us); James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania
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Retaliation against the British exclusions was even sometimes said to be the
primary purpose of the Constitution. Charles Pinckney argued to the South Carolina
House of Representatives that the first great inconvenience of the Confederation
was the destruction of our commerce because the general government could not
counteract the restrictions of other nations.74 Shortly before the Annapolis
Convention, Madison wrote to Jefferson that "if any thing should reconcile
Virg[ini]a[] to the idea of giving Cong[ress] a power over her trade, it will be that
this power is likely to annoy G[reat] B[ritian] against whom the animosities of our
[clitizens are still strong."7 Even staunch Anti-Federalists endorsed the idea that
the new government should be empowered to impose a retaliatory impost to open
up the British West-Indies to American ships.76
The retaliatory impost or embargo was similar to a revenue-producing impost
in that both required a uniform national policy for all American ports. When
Massachusetts had tried to impose a penalty tax on British ships to force open the
ports of the British West-Indies, other states had undercut her by welcoming British
ships into their ports." For an embargo or impost to be effective, it could not be
Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 431
("Devoid of national importance, we could not procure, for our exports a tolerable sale at
foreign markets."); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 65, at 135-36 (Alexander Hamilton)
("The want of a power to regulate commerce ... operated as a bar to the formation of
beneficial treaties with foreign powers. .. ").
" Charles Pinckney, Speech in the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16,
1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 253. Consistently, Professor John Crowley
has written that "[i]n the name of seeking power to regulate commerce, Congress really only
sought authority for retaliatory Navigation Acts." CROWLEY, supra note 2, at 94.
" Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 55, at 344. See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Mar. 18, 1786), 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 502.
The Annapolis Convention was an important stepping stone to the Philadelphia con-
vention. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITuTION 32 (1996); NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800, at
259-66 (1978). See also id. at 251-66 for a discussion of how giving Congress the power
over commerce contributed to the constitutional movement in Virginia.
76 The Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, PA. PACKET, Dec. 18,
1987, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 14 (regretting that "[wie
were suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations, who had shackled our commerce,
while we were unable to retaliate"); "Centinel VI," PA. PACKET, Dec. 25, 1787, reprinted in
15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 99 (finding "considerable benefit [in] strength-
ening the hands of Congress, so as to... counteract the adverse restrictions of other nations").
17 Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in
16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 13 (writing that while Massachusetts and New
Hampshire had both attempted an exclusion of British ships to punish Britain for its
strictness against American commerce, the attempts were suspended because the competing
ports in other states would not join the embargo and so got the advantage of British ships not
welcomed in Massachusetts and New Hampshire).
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open to an easy and free end run through a neighboring state. New York had tried
to impose a discriminatory impost on foreign goods brought in from New Jersey or
Connecticut in order to enforce retaliatory exclusions against the British.8 The
states would clearly have to present a united front.
Whatever the perceived importance of the power to retaliate against the British,
however, the proposal to retaliate came to nothing. On the first working day of the
Congress under the new Constitution, Madison introduced his proposal for an
impost. His bill would raise federal revenue, but it also would have discriminated
against British ships. "The union by the establishment of a more effective govern-
ment," Madison said, "[has] recovered from [its] state of [impotence and] imbecility,
that ... prevented a performance of its duty."79 Discrimination, that is, a higher
impost on British ships, might give Great Britain a motive to enter into a
commercial treaty, but even if Great Britain did not respond, Madison hoped, the
discriminatory impost would move American commerce away from Britain into its
more "natural channels," for instance, France.8 °
The Senate, however, lead by the New York delegation, stripped the anti-British
discrimination features from the 1789 impost bill.8' An American navigation act
was intended as a benefit for the Northern shipping states at the expense of Southern
commodities, but in the end, the Northern states did not want it. Great Britain
allowed American ships into the British home ports without restriction or
discrimination and opponents of retaliation feared that Britain might retaliate in turn
if faced with American port restrictions.82 The House acceded to the Senate, and
Madison's plan for discrimination against the British failed to be part of the enacted
impost.83 As Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick write, "Madison hardly pictured
78 JENSEN, supra note 54, at 338-39.
71 James Madison, Speech at the House of Representatives (Apr. 8, 1789), in 1 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS 107 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)[hereinafter 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS]. See also
James Madison, Speech at the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in I ANNALS OF
CONGRESS, supra at 193 (arguing that we will not give Great Britain a motive for entering
into a treaty unless we discriminate against them).
80 James Madison, Speech at the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS, supra note 79, at 193 (describing trade with Britain is an "artificial channel"
larger than natural).
" Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick have collected the evidence for the New York mer-
chants opposing discrimination. ELKINS & MCKrrRICK, supra note 66, at 766 n.66. While
there was no specifically anti-British discriminations, there were differentials in whether
goods were imported in American ships. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
82 Cf John Laurence, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 79, at 192 (arguing that England does not now dis-
criminate against American vessels coming into England).
13 An Act for Laying a Duty on Goods, Wares and Merchandises Imported into the
United States, July 4, 1789, 1 STAT. 24-27 (May 16 and 26, 1789), in 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS, supra note 79, at 409 (reporting that the 5% impost passed but discrimination
defeated).
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himself as a spokesman for the interests of American merchants. Indeed, when
merchants objected to his plan, he turned his hostility upon them, charging that they
were unduly subservient to British influence." '
A retaliatory impost against British shipping probably never was a good idea.
The British were intransigent on the subject. After independence they reviewed
their policy and decided that allowing American ships into the British West-Indies
would just enrich a rival shipper and encourage more American ships. Britain also
rightly considered that it had the best and cheapest manufactured goods and gave the
best credit on the globe so that it need not worry about Americans trying to cut off
access to British exports, whatever their desires.85 There were also not very many
British ships coming into American ports against which to retaliate because
American shipping was on its way to monopolizing transatlantic shipping. By 1796,
American ships, by successful competition and American oak, were carrying over
90% of the transatlantic commerce . 6 A penalty against British ships would not have
been much of an economic stick, even if it extinguished the last of them. Penalties
would also have angered the British, perhaps into retaliation against American ships
going into British ports. American transatlantic shipping into Great Britain was
important to the commercial states and America could not afford a prohibitory trade
war with Great Britain. The British West Indies prohibitions on American ships,
moreover, were porous; the islands themselves were happy to evade the prohibitions
on American trade and encourage smuggling.87 For Virginia, finally, leaving
American vessels as the only bidders for the shipping of Virginia crops by excluding
British ships from American ports would have raised shipping costs or lowered crop
prices, both to the detriment of Virginia.8 Madison's discriminatory impost is
" ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 66, at 88. See also id. at 432 (referring to the
"ideological liability, that of Madison's stubborn commitment to a system of coercive
legislation against the commerce of Great Britain").
85 SHEFFIELD, supra note 66, at 264-65, cited in ELKINS & MCKrrRICK, supra note 66,
at 69-71. See also Letter from Andrew Allen to Tench Coxe (Sept. 8, 1787), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 362 (arguing that proponents of the Constitution
are too sanguine in assuming adoption will immediately "extend[] Commerce or open[] new
Channels of Trade"); ROBERT B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 194
(1987) (citing a British merchant who responded to the threat of American sanctions by
saying "Pish"). Madison, by contrast, argued that America could retaliate against Britain,
because in the case of a war of commercial relations between the two nations, the loss to
Great Britain's commerce and manufactures would be severe. James Madison, Speech at the
House of Representatives (June 25, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 256
(Charles F. Holson et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter 13 MADISON PAPERS].
86 ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 66, at 414.
87 See, e.g., id. at 131 (finding that a treaty opening West Indies for trade would just
confirm what was already accessible informally).
" But see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1784), in 8
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 102-04 (arguing for the regulation of trade only to
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probably best understood as driven by ideological hatred of Great Britain, more than
by any reasonable view of American self-interest. 89
The punitive impost cannot be given much weight to explain the Constitution,
notwithstanding how prominently it shows up in the constitutional debates. The
failure of Congress to endorse the proposal in 1789 serves as a deliberative poll of
the sentiment of the nation, about as close to the adoption of the Constitution as we
can ask for, and the poll was unfavorable to the retribution. The country, when
asked, did not want the remedy. The retaliatory impost was plausibly a part of
Madison's thinking, and that alone makes it part of the cause of the Constitution, but
Madison could not get a majority for retaliation, over opposition both in Virginia
and in the shipping states. A proposal that failed to pass even after it was allowable
under the ratified Constitution cannot be used as a strong explanation of why the
constitutional revolution was needed or adopted.
C. American Mercantilism
While the Framers objected to British restrictions requiring that only British
ships could supply the British West Indies, they simultaneously wanted to require
that American products could be carried only in American ships. The Commerce
Clause gave Congress the power to imitate the same British Navigation Act
exclusions, objected to above, so as to give U.S. vessels exclusive monopolies on
shipping American commodities out of U.S. ports (thirty cites and 22%).90
reduce the trade of Great Britain to an equality with other nations and not to make a mer-
cantile element rich).
89 See ELKINS & McKTRICK, supra note 66, at 131, 375-88, 432 (arguing that Madison
had an "ideological liability," i.e., a "stubborn commitment to a system of coercive legis-
lation against the commerce of Great Britain").
Madison and Jefferson did see retribution against the British differently. Madison
believed that the British would have to cave in because "the farmer can live better without
the shop-keeper than the shop-keeper without the farmer." James Madison, Speech at the
House of Representatives on Navigation and Trade (May 13, 1790), in 13 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 85, at 213. For Jefferson in Paris, the failure of the retaliatory impost of British
shipping hurt France, which had "spent her blood and money" for the American cause and
helped Britain, which had "moved heaven, earth and hell to exterminate us." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 364, 366-67 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). For descriptions of the issue more
sympathetic to Jefferson and Madison views on anti-British discrimination, see Drew R.
McCoy, Republicanism and American Foreign Policy: James Madison and the Political
Economy of Commercial Discrimination, 1789 to 1794, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 633 (1974).
9' (1) Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 75,78 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS]
(arguing that Dutch "commercial regulations are more rigid and numerous, than those of any
other country; and it is by a judicious and unremitted vigilance of government, that they have
been able to extend their traffic to a degree so much beyond their natural and comparative
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advantages"); (2) Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Dec. 18, 1784), in 22
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 78 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995)
(describing proposal to invest Congress the power to "regulate the duties upon imports &
exports, by wh[ich] if wise regulations are adopted, we may take some share in the carrying
trade by giving priviledges to our own citizens in the exportation"); (3) Letter from Richard
Henry Lee (Oct. 10, 1785), in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 482
(arguing that the Northern and Southern states are so different that "the Staple States should
[oppose] the proposed plan of vesting powers absolute for the restraint & regulation of
Commerce in [Congress] whose Constituents are very differently circumstanced"); (4)
Gouverneur Morris, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787), in
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 451 (opposing the requirement of a two-thirds vote
for the regulation of commerce because encouraging American ships and seamen would
reduce Southern produce costs and improve security); (5) Hugh Williamson, Speech at the
Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 451 (arguing that if "Northern States should push their regulations [of commerce] too
far, the S[outhern] States would build ships for themselves"); (6) Charles Pinckney, Speech
at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra
note 15, at 449-50 (saying that the interests of the Southern states were against regulation
of commerce, but that he thought it proper to allow power to make commercial regulations
because of the concessions that the North had made); (7) James Wilson, Speech at the
Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 616 (explaining that power to grant monopolies was included in the power to regulate
commerce); (8) George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 14,
1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 616 (opposing monopolies and arguing
that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to give monopolies); (9)
Eldridge Gerry, Speech at the Federal Convention (King notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 635 (opposing giving Congress power to regulate
commerce because it would enable Congress to "create corporations and monopolies"); (10)
George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 631 (asking for a two-thirds majority for the
adoption of Navigation Acts to prevent "a few rich merchants" in New York, Philadelphia
and Boston from monopolizing shipping and reducing the value of southern crops by perhaps
one-half); (11) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No preference shall be given by any Regulation
of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another."); (12) Letter from
North Carolina Delegates to Governor Richard Caswell (Sept. 18, 1787), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 216 ("A navigation Act or the Power to regulate
Commerce in the Hands of the National Government by which American Ships and Seamen
may be fully employed is the desirable weight that is thrown into the Northern Scale."); (13)
Alexander Hamilton, Conjectures About the New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 9 (arguing that the "good will of the commercial
interests throughout the states" will give all its efforts to the Constitution to establish a
government capable of regulating, protecting and extending commerce); (14) Letter from
Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 281 (arguing that the "Commercial plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious
Trader"); (15) George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 350 fearing that:
By requiring only a majority to make all Commercial & Navigation
Laws, the five Southern States... will be ruined; [because laws] may
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be made as will enable the Merchants of the Northern & Eastern States
not only to demand an exorbitant Freight, but to monopolize the
Purchase of the Commodities at their own Price.
(16) THE FEDERALIST No. 12, supra note 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (praising the fostering of
commerce so as to increase the circulation of precious metals, invigorate the channels of
industry and boost government revenue); (17) "The Landholder" [Oliver Ellsworth], CONN.
COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 165
(writing that George Mason's opposition to giving Congress the power to regulate trade was
"an open decided preference of all the world to you"); (18) "Agrippa VI," MASS. GAZETTE,
Dec. 14, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 428 (opposing
congressional power to grant exclusive charters because they would be "injurious to...
commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying... rivalship"); (19) "Agrippa XIV," MASS.
GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 821
(stating that while a system of commerce established by national authority would be
beneficial in some respects, still most governments establish companies that have ill effects
on trade and that "[als we are situated at one extreme of the empire, two or three such
companies would annihilate the importance of our seaports, by transferring the trade to
Philadelphia"); (20) Thomas Dawes, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention
(Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 58 (objecting that without the
Constitution's regulation of commerce, "[a] vessel from Roseway or Halifax finds as hearty
a welcome with its fish and whalebone at the southern ports, as though it was built,
navigated, and freighted from Salem or Boston"); (21) James Bowdoin, Speech at the
Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
13, at 130 ("[W]ell-being of trade depends upon the proper regulation of it," and unregulated
trade has ruined, rather than enriched, those who carry it on.); (22) Thomas Russell, Speech
at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 13, at 139 (arguing that Congress should confine shipping to American vessels, just as
all the great trading nations have benefitted from "secur[ing] to themselves the advantages
of their carrying trade"); (23) RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
GENERAL COURT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS RATIFICATION CONVENTION, (Feb. 6, 1788),
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 177 (recommending that "Congress erect
no company of merchants with exclusive advantages of commerce"); (24) Williamson
Speech at Edenton, supra note 24, at 231 ("By the sundry regulations of commerce, it will
be in the power of Government not only to collect a vast revenue for the general benefit of
the nation, but to secure the carrying trade in the hands of citizens in preference to
strangers."); (25) Letter from John Howard to George Thatcher (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 230 (writing that wise commercial regulations
will reduce imports of foreign luxuries in foreign ships to one-tenth and end the current
situation where "our own vessels are rotting in the docks, our seamen strolling the streets,
and our merchants daily becoming bankrupt"); (26) NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Va.), Mar.
12, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 380 (stating that
gentlemen of Virginia opposing the Constitution "fear, that a majority of the States may
establish regulations of commerce which will give great advantage to the carrying trade of
America and be a means of encouraging New England vessels rather than old England");
(27) Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (May 5, 1788), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 15, at 303 (stating that "Southern or Staple States" accommodated to the Northern
states by allowing a Navigation Act giving them exclusive carrying of commodities, although
Southern States would of course have lower freight costs if "[s]hips of every Nation may
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Both Hamilton and Madison were mercantilists, by their participation in the
serious thinking of the times. Mercantilism focused on stimulating foreign exports
and discouraging foreign imports so as to maximize the domestic supply of specie.
Mercantilism assumed that government should actively stimulate exports by giving
monopolies and bounties, and should also discourage imports by creating taxes and
restrictions." Hamilton's argument, that stimulation of foreign trade would contrib-
ute to the wealth of the whole nation, is a fine example of mercantilist philosophy:
The prosperity of commerce [i.e., foreign trade] is now
perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be
the most useful as well as the most productive source of national
wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their
political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by
promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious
metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,
[foreign trade] serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of
industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and
copiousness.... It has been found in various countries, that in
proportion as [foreign trade] has flourished, land has risen in
value....
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be propor-
tioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation,
and to the celerity with which it circulates. Commerce [i.e.
foreign trade], contributing to both these objects, must of
necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the
requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of
the Emperor of Germany, contain a great extent of fertile,
cultivated and populous territory, a large proportion of which is
situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this
come into their [plorts"); (28) Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton (May
26, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 465 (stating that the danger
of monopolized trade may be avoided by requiring three-fourths of the states to approve
regulations of commerce); (29) Alexander Hamilton, Speech at the New York Ratification
Convention (June 20, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 236 (It was in the
interest of the Northern States that "they should have full power, by a majority in Congress,
to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of the navigation of
foreigners."); (30) M. Smith, Resolution in the New York Ratification Convention (July 2,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 407 ("[Nlothing in the Constitution con-
tained shall be construed to authorize Congress to grant monopolies, or erect any company
with exclusive advantages of commerce.").
"' See, e.g., CROWLEY, supra note 2, at xiii (tracing the ideas of government intervention
back to the 14th century).
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territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in
Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of
commerce [foreign trade], that monarch can boast but slender
revenues.
92
Mercantilism as a philosophy disapproved of imports, in part because they
caused the outflow of the precious specie that would stimulate internal exchanges.
For example, "Honestus," in New York in 1785 blamed New York's economic
problems on the unfavorable balance of trade that drew gold and silver out of New
York. "Merchants were 'the bane and pest' of the country," Honestus claimed, be-
cause without them, "luxuries would not [be] imported in such huge volume." 93 The
constitutional debates are also filled with moral condemnation of imported luxuries.
Federalist Tench Coxe condemned the "ineffective" federal government under the
Articles for its inability to control the "wanton consumption" of imported luxuries.
94
"Devoid of national power," James Wilson regretted to Pennsylvania, "we could not
prohibit the extravagance of our importations nor could we derive a revenue from
their excess." 95 "Wise commercial regulations," said Federalist John Howard, "will
reduce imports of foreign luxuries in foreign ships to one-tenth. 96 We need a con-
trolling Union government to regulate commerce, George Washington wrote, to bal-
ance against the "luxury, effeminacy and corruption" introduced by foreign trade.97
Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution were no friendlier to imported
luxuries. At the Philadelphia Convention, Anti-Federalist George Mason had des-
canted, Madison tells us, on the necessity of restricting the "excessive consumption
of foreign superfluities." 98 Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry argued to Virginia that
"we buy too much, and make too little" and that a mere change in government
would not cure the causes. 99 John Lansing opened the Anti-Federalist opposition at
the New York Ratification debate with a fine mercantilist diagnosis, arguing that the
92 THE FEDERALIST No. 12, supra note 24, at 73-75 (Alexander Hamilton).
9' "Honestus," N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 27, 1786, quoted in KAMINSKI, supra note 29, at 99.
94 TENCH CoxE, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A COMMERCIAL SYSTEM
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SHOULD BE FOUNDED 5-6 (1787) (regretting that an
"ineffective [and] disjointed" federal government should not be able to overcome the
"wanton consumption of imported luxuries").
" James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 1787),
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 431 (emphasis omitted).
96 Letter from John Howard to George Thatcher (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 230.
97 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 298, 299-300 (W. Abbot ed.,
1994) [hereinafter 3 WASHINGTON PAPERS].
98 George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 13, 1787), in
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 606.
9' Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 9, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 157.
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cause of current embarrassments is want of money arising, because "[o]n the
termination of war . . .we launched into every species of extravagance, and
imported European goods to an amount far beyond our ability to pay."'"4 The
French Counsel reported home that the New York opponents of the Constitution
wanted fewer commercial ties with Europe, which only furnished them with
"luxuries that they must do without to live in the simplicity that befits a newborn
State." O1 The wearing of British machine-woven woolens was considered immoral:
"How many thousands are daily wearing the manufactures of Europe, when, by a
little industry and frugality, they might wear those of their own country," Anti-
Federalist John Williams complained to New York.'0 2
Mercantilism's general espousal of frugality and disapproval of imported
luxuries can, indeed, be traced back for at least the prior hundred years.0 3 The
participants in the ratification debates all approved of restricting imports and keeping
specie at home, regardless of their support for the Constitution. On his inauguration
in 1789, Washington was to wear "a great rarity" - "a suit made from cloth woven
in the United States."'10 4
"Regulations of commerce" included subsidies as well as restrictions. Even
Anti-Federalists believed, in the spirit of their times, that trade "cannot flourish,
unless a power is somewhere vested, to cherish those Branches of Commercial
Intercourse which are favorable to the Nation, and to check those of a contrary
tendency."' 10 5 Hamilton had argued as early as 1781 that the Congress needed the
"power of regulating trade, comprehending a right of granting bounties and
premiums by way of encouragement.''06
o John Lansing, Speech at the New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1787), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 218.
... Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 25, 1787), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 190.
02 John Williams, Speech at the New York Ratification Convention (June 21, 1788), in
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 240 (calling for the abandonment of all the foreign
commodities that "deluged our country, which have loaded us with debt."). See also "A
Citizen of Dutchess County," N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 6, 1786, noted in KAMINSKI, supra note
29, at 99 (suggesting New York should prohibit "the importation of all foreign articles that
might be made among us, and [levy] heavy duties on all imported luxuries"). Cf Rebecca
K. Starr, Political Mobilization, 1765-1776, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 231, 238 (Jack P. Green & J.R. Pole eds., 1991) (stating that a
pledge to use homespun cloth was a symbolic display of loyalty to the Revolutionary cause
at the outset of the War).
103 See, e.g., IRWIN, supra note 2, at 37.
'04 JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 214 (1969).
"05 Samuel Osgood & Arthur Lee, Address from the United States in Congress Assembled,
to the Legislatures of the Several States (Aug. 31, 1786), in 31 JOURNALS 613,618 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934).
106 Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist IV (Aug. 30, 1781), in 2 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra
note 90, at 670 (emphasis omitted).
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Mercantilism also praised government restrictions in general. In 1782,
Hamilton, thinking as a mercantilist, had argued in favor of active government
regulation of commerce. Dutch commercial regulations, he said, "are more rigid and
numerous, than those of any other country; and it is by a judicious and unremitted
vigilance of government, that they have been able to extend their traffic to a degree
so much beyond their natural and compar[a]tive advantages."' 7 James Bowdoin
argued before the Massachusetts Ratification Convention that the well-being of trade
depended upon the proper regulation of it and that unregulated trade would ruin
rather than enrich those who carried it on."°' George Washington argued that "it
behoves us to place [commerce] in the most convenient channels, under proper
regulation - freed, as much as possible from those vices [from] which luxury...
naturally introduce."'"' Hamilton denounced the argument that trade would regulate
itself as a "wild speculative paradox[] ... contrary to the uniform practice and sense
of the most enlightened nations."' 0 Madison joined in the enthusiasm, denouncing
those who were "decoying the people into a belief that trade ought in all cases to be
left to regulate itself."''
In true mercantilist terms, James Madison explained the whole destitution of the
federal level and state encroachments upon federal rights in terms of an absence of
regulation of foreign commerce and an unfavorable balance of trade:
Another unhappy effect of the present anarchy of our commerce
will be a continuance of the unfavorable balance on it, which by
draining us of our metals furnishes pretexts for the pernicious
substitution of paper money, for indulgence to debtors and for
postponement of taxes. In fact, most of our political errors may
be traced up to our commercial ones, and most of moral [errors]
may to our political [errors]. 2
Even federalization of the state imposts can be explained in mercantilist terms,
107 Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra
note 90, at 78.
0' James Bowdoin, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788),
in 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 13, at 130.
'9 Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 29, 1784), in 3
WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 97, at 239 (emphasis omitted).
..0 Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra
note 90, at 76.
.. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1784), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 102.
1' Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 55, at 501. In the passage just before the one quoted, Madison makes
clear that he is complaining about the failure of the states to unify to achieve an enforceable
embargo or retaliatory impost against the British.
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as allowing for a better suppression of imports. The states undercut each other on
impost tax rates to draw ships to their own ports. Only the federal government
could enforce a uniform rate that would produce significant revenue and regulate
imports. James Wilson, for example, told the Pennsylvania ratification convention
the Articles of Confederation needed to be replaced because "[d]evoid of power, we
could neither prevent the excessive importations which lately deluged the country,
nor even raise from that excess a contribution to the public revenue. . . ."' Only
high taxes on imports could suppress the corruption of wonton and luxurious
consumption that imports represented.
The Constitution prohibited the federal government from taxing exports 4 and
that is also best explained by mercantilism. A ban on federal tax of exports is not
explained by fear of the discriminatory abuse by New York (and other deep-water
harbor states) monopolizing the taxes on exports at the expense of its neighbors.
Arguably, the ban on export taxes was just favoritism toward the South, which had
the most commodities for export. Still, mercantilism favored exports because they
would bring specie into the country, and a tax on exports would suppress them.
Thus the constitutional scheme, a federal tax on imports, but not on exports, was
consistent with the dominant economics even without any southern favoritism.
In 1789 James Madison spoke to the new Congress saying that "if industry and
labour are left to take their own course, they will generally be directed to those objects
which are the most productive.""'  He promptly listed as necessary exceptions,
however, every program then even vaguely contemplated to restrict the free flow:
Congress should impose regulatory imposts to induce foreign ports not to exclude
American ships, to encourage American shipping, to foster local manufacturing, to
discourage consumption of disfavored goods, to embargo in time of war, to encourage
domestic war supplies independent of foreign sources, and to obtain revenue." 6 By
the time he had finished his list, the exceptions had swallowed the free trade.
Indeed, given that Madison had condemned those who advocated free trade. 7 and
had traced most of our political and moral errors to the imports that drained us of
our precious metals," 8 the insincere part of Madison's 1789 address to the House
was the opening claim that he was "the friend to a very free system of commerce."" 9
Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 141.
114 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5.
" James Madison, Speech at the House of Representatives (Apr. 9, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 71 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter 12
MADISON PAPERS].
116 Id. at 73.
"17 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 102.
118 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 55, at 501.
"9 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 115, at 71.
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Once free trade replaced mercantilism as an economic philosophy, thanks
mostly to the work of Adam Smith, importing British woolens and other
manufactured goods came to be seen as a wise decision to buy the highest quality
goods at the best price abroad, rather than wasting resources doing an inferior job
more expensively at home. If there is one truth that economists across the political
spectrum now agree on it is that the wealth of the nation cannot be generally
improved by banning imports."12 ' When Adam Smith took hold, importing machine-
woven woolen clothing no longer looked like such a moral sin.
Madison and the other proponents of the Constitution had also advocated
specific programs in the ratification debates that were inconsistent with free trade.
1. Port Preferences
In 1784, Madison, in the spirit of mercantilism, had sponsored a port bill in the
Virginia Assembly, which would have required that all trade between Virginians and
foreign parts had to be conducted out of a single Virginia port. By giving a monop-
oly or franchise to one Virginia port, Madison wanted to establish a Baltimore or
Philadelphia in Virginia. Madison complained that prices for Virginia export
tobacco were 15-20% higher on the Philadelphia wharves than in Virginia."'2 The
port monopoly would capture the premium for Virginians and encourage develop-
ment of Virginian port facilities. Port monopolies had been actively used by Britain
to protect its industry and subsidize its ports.122 The port preferences have been said
to be the economic "centerpiece" of the Madison's coalition out of which the consti-
tutional movement arose.'2 3 Both Thomas Jefferson
2
' and George Washington125
supported the port monopoly idea.
As the Virginia legislature considered Madison's bill, the ports included within
the monopoly were expanded to two, Alexandria and Norfolk, and then to four,
120 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 686 (15th ed. 1995)
("[T]he theory of comparative advantage is one of the deepest truths in all of economics."). For
a recent review of the literature supporting free trade and comparative advantage arguments
see Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passi?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (1987). See also IRWIN,
supra note 2, which includes a discussion of where exceptions to free trade might bejustified.
121 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 307.
122 See ALBERT ANTHONY GIESECKE, AMERICANCOMMERCIALLEGISLATION BEFORE 1789,
at 77-82, 100-06 (1910) (stating that American iron exports had been required to go first to
the port of London, while Carolina rice exports were allowed to bypass Britain entirely).
123 BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, A PLANTERS' REPUBLIC: THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC INDE-
PENDENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 269 (1996).
124 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 11, 1784), in 8 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 55, at 127.
121 RAGSDALE, supra note 123, at 269.
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adding Bermuda's Hundred (below Richmond on the James River) and Tappa-
hannock (below Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock River). By 1786, the
monopoly had been diluted to include seventeen listed Virginia ports. 26 The
Virginia legislature also exempted Virginia-owned ships from the port restrictions.'2 7
Madison denied that he meant to sacrifice the "conveniency" of planters to
provide incentives for merchants, 2 8 but the monopoly nonetheless seemed
motivated by allowing the listed ports to charge a premium for shipping Virginia
crops. Plausibly, Virginia as a whole would not be helped by the port monopoly
even if it succeeded: the 15-20% premium for tobacco on Philadelphia wharves was
probably a price buyers were willing to pay for the convenience of using the well-
developed wharves of a well-protected, deep-water port. If so, then buyers would
not pay the premium for less convenient Virginia shallow-water docks. Any
premium available for the Virginia ports would then just reduce the sale price
available to the planters. Madison's port preference, as Professor Risjord describes
it, was solidly grounded in mercantilist thought, if not common sense.' 29 Madison
also had an anti-British motive: he was afraid of re-establishment of the colonial
trade ties between Britain and the planters if British ships were to dock at the bottom
of each planter's dock 3 ' and, once again, anti-British ideology seemed as important
as Virginia self-interest.
George Mason vehemently opposed the Virginia port restrictions. Mason
likened the port bill to putting a chain across the channel of Virginia's finest rivers
at just sufficient depth to restrict deep-water ships from passing. '3' To use a cur-
rent analogy, the port bill was like throwing a very large rock into the river at the
126 Bill Restricting Foreign Vessels to Virginia Certain Ports (June 8, 1784) editorial note,
in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 64. See RAGSDALE, supra note 123, at 269-72;
RISJORD, supra note 75, at 136-37.
127 RAGSDALE, supra note 123, at 270. Giving Virginia-owned ships an exemption from
the port preference, while still subjecting other U.S.-owned ships to the import fee, was a
violation of the Articles of Confederation prohibition on a state's imposing any tax or
restriction on an out-of-state U.S. citizen that was not imposed on its own citizens, ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781), and Madison told Monroe that it "was an erratum
which will no doubt be rectified." Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20,
1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 55, at 103. Virginia ownership of deep-water ships
would not have been material at the time, however.
128 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 103.
129 RISJORD, supra note 75, at 137. See also CROWLEY, supra note 2, at 100 (describing
Madison's approach to the port bills a bit more sympathetically as a "provincial mercantilist"
trying to provide commercial incentives).
130 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 102-03.
'3 Protest by "A Private Citizen " against the Port Bill (Nov.-Dec. 1786), in 2 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE MASON 859 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) [hereinafter 2 MASON PAPERS].
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bottom of each planter's wharf, 32 Mason had been an ally of Madison's regarding
enforcement of the British debts and he argued that giving foreign merchants
speedy justice and honest payment of our debts would be "a more effectual means
of inviting foreigners to trade with us" than the port monopoly.133 Mason was not
consistently laissez faire: he was in favor of industry subsidies such as high,
protectionist imposts,"3 and grants and bounties, 35 but Mason was right in being
against port preferences.
Mason's views prevailed in the Constitutional Convention. The Constitutional
text, as adopted, prohibits preferences "given by any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another."' 36 Madison was sorry that
port preferences lost. The prohibition, he told Pendleton, was "dictated by the jeal-
ousy of some particular States, and was inserted pretty late in the Session."' 37 The
Constitution thus prohibited what had been a "centerpiece" or at least a core
concrete example of what Madison had in mind while serving in the Virginia
legislature for regulation of commerce. While giving port preferences was a pur-
pose for the constitutional movement in Virginia, it was not a purpose that survived
into the constitutional document itself.
2. An American Navigation Act
The proponents of the Constitution objected to the British exclusion of
American ships from the British West Indies, under the British Navigation Act, but
they simultaneously wanted an American version of the Act to exclude British ships
in American ports and to give American vessels a monopoly in the business of
carrying American commodities. In the Massachusetts ratification convention, for
example, Thomas Russell argued that all the great trading nations had benefitted
from "secur[ing] to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade" and that
"' See, e.g., Lawrence Summers, Speech Before U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 10,
1999), in Federal Document Clearing House (saying that removing rocks from the harbor
would be a good thing).
13 Protest by "A Private Citizen" against the Port Bill (Nov.-Dec. 1786), in 2 MASON
PAPERS, supra note 131, at 861.
"' George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 28, 1787), in
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 441 (asking Congress to allow states to tax imports
so as to protect local manufacturing).
135 George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 13, 1787), in
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 606 (advocating association to discourage foreign
superfluities and to encourage American economy, frugality and manufactures).
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. See Mssrs. Carrol & Luther Martin (Madison notes, Aug.
25, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 417 (arguing that Congress might
enact port preferences, requiring "vessels belonging or bound to Baltimore, to enter [and]
clear at Norfolk").
' Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 28, 1787), in 10 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 24, at 223.
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Congress should confine American shipping to American vessels.'3 8 Rhode Island
was Anti-Federal, stingy in giving revenue to the federal government, but it was also
a shipping state eager to allow Congress the power to prohibit the importation of
foreign goods except in American vessels. 139 In North Carolina, Hugh Williamson
argued that regulation of commerce would allow the government "to secure the
carrying trade in the hands of citizens in preference to strangers."' 4 Governeur
Morris of Pennsylvania argued to the Philadelphia Convention that an American
navigation act, requiring only American vessels for American exports and imports,
would encourage American ships and American seamen, and would ultimately both
reduce costs of transporting Southern produce and improve security.141
Sometimes what was wanted was not just an exclusion of British ships from the
American trade but also exclusion of British merchants. In April of 1785, a commit-
tee of Boston merchants that included John Hancock met at Faneuil Hall and voted
in favor of a petition to give Congress immediate power to regulate the trade of the
United States. The immediate complaint was that British merchants residing in
Boston had received large quantities of English goods and expected more, which
threatened an entire monopoly by those merchants. The British imports were said
to be "calculated to drain us of our currency and have a direct tendency to impov-
erish this country."' 42 Pending a congressional remedy, the merchants voted not to
lease or sell any shop or warehouse to the British merchants for sale of their goods
nor to employ anyone who assisted the British. They also asked that Massachusetts
naval officers prevent goods destined for the British merchants from being landed. 43
Regulation of trade would protect the Boston merchants from British competitors.
Going back into the Revolutionary War period, the British Navigation Act
restrictions on trade had actually been quite popular in America, when American
suppliers were beneficiaries inside the monopoly restrictions.1 " In 1774 as the War
'3 Thomas Russell, Speech at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788),
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 139.
139 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE CONGRESS (Jan. 3, 1786), reprinted in 30
JOURNALS 8, 10 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) (noting that Rhode Island ratified the 1783
impost subject to a substantial list of self-serving conditions, but agreed to ratify any article
empowering Congress "to regulate, restrain, or prohibit the importation of all foreign goods
in any but American [v]essels.").
'0 Williamson Speech at Edenton, supra note 24, at 231.
Gouverneur Morris, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 450; see also Letter from North Carolina
Delegates to Governor Richard Caswell (Sept. 18, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 216 ("A navigation [a]ct or the Power to regulate [c]ommerce in the Hands
of the National Government by which American Ships and Seamen may be fully employed
is the desirable weight that is thrown into the Northern Scale.").
142 Monthly Chronology, for April, 1785, BOSTON MAO., Apr. 4, 1785, at 156.
141 Id. at 155-56.
'44 OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
290-300 (1951) (arguing that the Navigation Act was not the cause of the Revolution and
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drew nearer, the Continental Congress had denied that the British had the right to
raise revenue from the colonies, without the consent of the colonies, but the
Congress had simultaneously "cheerfully consented" that Parliament could secure
the benefits of regulating commerce for both the mother country and colonies, with
taxes that channeled commerce."a5 The Framers were, apparently, not against a
navigation act in principle, but only against being outside the protection and ex-
cluded from the West Indies by the monopoly of the British Navigation Act.
At the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason opposed giving Congress the
power to enact commercial or navigation restrictions by simple majority vote.
Mason argued that with a navigation act, "a few rich merchants" in New York,
Philadelphia and Boston could monopolize shipping and reduce the value of
southern crops by perhaps one half.'46 The southern states would be ruined, Mason
argued, because commercial laws would enable "the Merchants of the Northern
[and] Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant Freight, but to monopolize the
Purchase of the Commodities at their own Price."'4 7 The French Consul in Wil-
mington, North Carolina reported home the view, fair to Mason's viewpoint, that the
Constitution was all to the advantage of the northern shipping states because they
could raise shipping prices.'48 Both Edmund Randolph and George Mason came out
of the Convention citing the possibility of a navigation act as a reason why they
refused to sign the Constitution.'49 Soon after the Convention broke, Richard Henry
Lee complained that the "Commercial plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious
was actually quite popular). For a review of the economic history literature that finds the
Navigation Act had a trivial adverse impact, see Larry Sawers, The Navigation Acts
Revisited, 45 ECON. HISTORY REV. 262 (1992) (arguing, contrarily, that the burdens of the
Navigation Act did in fact play a key role in causing the Revolution).
141 Oct. 14, 1774, in 1 JOURNALS 69 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1904).
146 George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 631. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had
proposed at the Convention that Congress should require a two-thirds majority for any
regulation of commerce or navigation act, but his motion was defeated, four states in favor
and seven against. (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 453. The Committee of Detail, chaired by John Rutledge of South Carolina, also
required a two-thirds majority for a navigation act. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL,
DRAFT OF ART. VII, § 6 (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 183.
However, this provision both appeared and disappeared without an explanation.
"' George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 350.
148 Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzeme (Feb. 2, 1788), in
16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 13.
149 Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct.
10, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 127 (citing the power to regulate com-
merce without two-thirds majority as reason not to sign the Constitution); GEORGE MASON,
OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT (Sept. 15, 1787), reprinted in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 639-40 (stating that a majority vote allows Northern
merchants to demand exorbitant rates, but a two-thirds vote produces mutual moderation).
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Trader."' 5° Opposition to "corporations and monopolies," more generally, was a
recurring theme among Anti-Federalist opponents to the Constitution.' 5'
The demand for a two-thirds vote requirement for the regulation of commerce
did not succeed and the opposition to commercial monopolies did not prevent rati-
fication. On the other hand, nothing much came of the suggestion for adoption of an
American navigation act either. The Constitution itself cut the heart out of the idea
for an American navigation act by prohibiting Congress from imposing any tax on
exports.'52 The prohibition on export tax meant that Congress could not give a
differential tax advantage to American ships in the carrying of Southern com-
modities. Congress would have had to take the far more radical step of banning
foreign ships from carrying American exports entirely and Congress never seriously
considered a complete prohibition.
On the import side, where tax was allowed, Congress did use imports to
discriminate against foreign ships. The first tonnage fees imposed a tax of 6 cents
per ton on U.S.-owned ships, but 50 cents per ton on foreign-owned ships. 15 3 In
1790, Congress adopted a discriminatory 10% tax rate on imports coming in on
foreign ships, while allowing a base line tax at only 5% for imports coming in on
U.S. ships. 54 The discrimination was gutted by the Jay Treaty of 1786 with Great
Britain, however, which obligated the United States and Great Britain to stop putting
50 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 3 MASON PAPERS,
supra note 131, at 996.
' ' See, e.g., Eldridge Gerry, Speech at the Federal Convention (King notes, Sept. 15,
1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 635 (opposing congressional power to
regulate commerce because the authority will enable Congress "to create corporations and
monopolies"); "Agrippa VI," MASS. GAZETrE, Dec. 14, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 428 (opposing congressional power to grant exclusive charters
because they would be injurious to commerce by enhancing prices and destroying rivalship);
"Agrippa XIV," MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 821 (stating that two or three monopoly charters in navigation "would
annihilate the importance of our seaports, by transferring the trade to Philadelphia"); M.
Smith, Resolution in New York Ratification Convention (July 2, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 13, at 407 ("[N]othing in the said Constitution contained shall be
construed to authorize Congress to grant monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive
advantages of commerce."); see also NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Va.), Mar. 12, 1788,
reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 380 (stating that gentlemen of
Virginia opposing the Constitution worry "that a majority of the States may establish
regulations of commerce which will give great advantage to the carrying trade of America,
and be a means of encouraging New England vessels rather than old England").
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
J Act of July 20, 1790, cl 30, 1 Stat. 135 (repealing Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27t
'54 Where scheduled taxes exceeded 10%, e.g., on Madeira, the tax on foreign-ship
imports did not add on to the impost. Act of Aug. 10, 1790, ch. 39, § 2, 1 Stat. 181. See also
Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 27 (reducing tax on imports by one-tenth, generally
from 5% to 42%, if the imports were carried in on U.S. ships).
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higher taxes on each other's ships,' 5 and it seems to have been ended generally in
1799 when general impost rates were raised to 10%.56
The discriminatory tonnage fees and the extra 5% tax on imports in foreign
owned ships from 1789-1799, while not insubstantial, were much less than what the
Federalists were calling for in advocating the Constitution. The call for monopoly
turned out, after deliberation, not to have majority support. Giving a monopoly to
American-owned vessels would have induced Britain, and indeed France as well,
to reciprocate with exclusions of American ships from European ports, which would
have been disastrous for American shipping that was supposed to be the beneficiary
of an American navigation act. Again, the argument seems overwhelming that
proposals that came to naught after deliberation by reason of insufficient support,
even once permitted, do not provide significant help in explaining why we had the
constitutional revolution.
D. Miscellaneous Deep-Water Shipping
There are also nine other uses of "commerce" or "regulation of commerce" where
deep-water shipping is the clear reference, but with a completely different kind of
remedy or with no remedy specified. 5 7 A writer named "Philadelphiensis," for
155 See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation [Jay's Treaty], Nov. 19, 1794, arts.
III, XV. See also SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND
DIPLOMACY 333-34 (1921).
156 Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage, ch. 22, § 61 (Mar.
2, 1799) (imposing the tax of 10% of cost). Imports from beyond the Cape of Good Hope
were taxed at 20% of cost, presumably because they would have a far larger mark up than
imports, e.g., from Europe, and the statute was using cost as an estimate of value. See id.
157 (1) Francis Hopkinson, An Ode, Philadelphia (July 4, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 247 ("Commerce her pond'rous anchor weigh,/ Wide spread her
sails/And in far distant seas her flag display"); (2) James Madison, Speech at the Federal
Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at
625 (explaining that whether states were to be denied power to lay harbor taxes called
"tonnage" depended on the scope of power to regulate commerce); (3) "Philadelphiensis
VII," PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 338 ("If America is to be a commercial neutral power, she ought to have
some naval strength to intitle her to the appellation."); (4) Edmund Randolph, Speech at the
Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at
73-74 (arguing that if Virginia failed to join the Constitution, then France to collect its debts
could destroy what little commerce Virginia had, seizing ships and laying waste to Virginia
shores); (5) Alexander Hamilton, Speech at the New York Ratification Convention (June 25,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 350 (arguing that the objects of the federal
government include "the regulation of commerce, - that is, the whole system of foreign
intercourse."); (6) James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 11,
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 249-50 (predicting that if America could
solve its present impotence, it could profit from carrying the commerce of nations at war);
(7) Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 25, 1788), in 18
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instance, argued that if America meant to be a commercial power, it should endeavor
to have a navy. 5 ' "Commerce" required a navy because it was a deep sea activity.
Edmund Randolph told Virginia that if the state failed to ratify the Constitution, then
France to collect its debt would seize ships and lay waste to Virginia's shores,
destroying what little "commerce" Virginia had.159 In two cites "commerce" is
defined as what "merchants" do,"6 and "merchants" seems to refer to only the deep-
water importers, and not to the country or retail storekeepers.' 6' When tax issues (37
cites), mercantilist restrictions 69 cites) and miscellaneous uses (9 cites) are com-
bined, deep-water shipping is the reference in 115, or 83%, of the cites. "Commerce"
within the constitutional debates referred primarily to Atlantic Ocean shipping.
There is one odd-man-out quote, on land but at the border, referring to the
border fur trade. The French consulate wrote home saying that the Constitution
would induce the British to leave the frontier posts, in conformity with the Treaty
of Paris, and that would leave commerce in furs almost exclusively to the United
States.'62 The reference might be to the trapping of furs, akin to manufacturing, or
to trade with the Indians. It seems also to reflect an especially French perspective
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 190 (stating that New York Anti-Federalists do
not want to involve themselves in commercial ties with Europe, "which only furnish them
with luxuries that they must do without to live in [ ]simplicity"); (8) THE FEDERALIST NO. 35
(Alexander Hamilton); (9) GENERAL COURT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS RATIFICATION
CONVENTION, RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (Feb. 6, 1788),
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 177.
' "Philadelphiensis VII," PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 338.
"' Edmund Randolph, Speech at the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788), in
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 74.
160 (8) THE FEDERALISTNO. 35, at 217 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("[I]n a country of small commercial capital, [a merchant] is often under a necessity of
keeping prices down in order to make a more expeditious sale"); (9) GENERALCOURTOFTHE
MASSACHUSETTS RATIFICATION CONVENTION, RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 177
(recommending "[tihat Congress erect no company [of merchants] with exclusive advantages
of commerce").
161 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF FINANCE (Robert Morris) (July 29, 1782), re-
printed in 22 JOURNALS 432 (Aug. 5, 1782) (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914) (This country has
always worked off of credit: "The Merchants in Europe trusted those of America. The
American Merchants trusted the Country Storekeepers, and they the People at large.");
GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT (Mason notes, Sept.
15, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 639-40 (stating that a two-
thirds vote requirement will produce "mutual moderation" between North and South). Accord
GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 66 (1992) (arguing that
in colonial times "merchants" were only the big importers). Country storekeepers might keep
"merchandise" under these definitions but they are not "merchants."
16' Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (May 29, 1788), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 145.
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given that the French North American empire had been active in fur trading. The
reference, however, is surely not a reference to deep-water shipping.
Ill. FAIRNESS BETWEEN STATES
Coastal shipping or other trade between the states shows up in only twenty-
three, or 17%, of the sampled quotes, and for many of those there is no remedy
attached." 3 A subset of thirteen uses of "commerce" refers to trading between the
statesl64 and a subset of ten justifies other enumerated restrictions on state abuses by
'63 The percentages within the sample have only a suggestive power as to how important
the issues were relative to each other. Number of cites is not an indication of intensity of
feeling, as indicated for instance by the fact that three of the four most mentioned programs
never got close to enactment.
'64 (1) MASS. GAZETrE, July 8, 1787, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
13, at 391 (stating that when the government can pay its debts "even the circulation of the
interest may become a national blessing, by increasing the means for commerce"); (2) Letter
from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Samuel Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787),
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 352 (arguing that restrictions on state debtor
relief legislation "was thought necessary as a security to commerce, in which the interest of
foreigners as well as the citizens of different states may be affected"); (3) James Wilson,
Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 13, at 492 ("Merchants... will tell you that they cannot trust their property to the
laws of the state in which their correspondents live."); (4) THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra
note 65, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that if the Constitution is not ratified, states
will impose tolls on interstate transportation as the German states do on their rivers); (5)
"Agrippa VIII," MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 516 (stating that commerce between diverse states is the "bond of union"
among the states); (6) Edmund Randolph, ReasonsforNot Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27,
1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 602 (The general government
needs "to be the supreme arbiter for adjusting every contention among the states ...
particularly in commerce, which will probably create the greatest discord."); (7) THE
FEDERALIST No. 35, supra note 160, at 217 (Alexander Hamilton); (8) THE FEDERALIST NO.
42, supra note 24, at 283 (James Madison) (stating that a "defect of power in the existing
confederacy [is the power] to regulate the commerce between its several members"); (9)
NEWPORT HERALD, Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13,
at 512 (complaining that Virginia's January 1788 impost imposed prohibitive rates on
American goods and commodities); (10) "Publicola," Address to the Freemen of North
Carolina, ST. GAZETTE N.C., Mar. 27, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 495 (asserting that if North Carolina does not ratify, "[t]he United States will treat
us as foreigners, and will.., preclude us from all commerce with them" and annihilate our
trade); (11) Edmund Randolph, Speech at the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6,
1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 985 (stating that "the commercial
regulations between [Virginia] and Maryland" have prevented reprisals on each other); (12)
"Phocion," On the Economic Advantages of Union: Providence Will be Another Antwerp,
Newport Another Brest, U.S. CHRON. (Providence, R.I.), July 17, 1788, reprinted in 2
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 529 ("[I]f we should join the new
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calling them "commerce issues."
A. Tolls on Interstate Commerce?
It has been said that creation of a common market allowing free trade within the
states was the purpose or at least a primary cause of the Constitution. In 1824,
Justice William Johnson argued that "[i]f there was any one object riding over every
other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse
among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.' ' 65 To this day it is
commonly echoed that the major purpose of the Constitution was to prevent
protectionist economic policies among the states and to establish a common market
with free trade across state borders."6
Confederacy, our former inland commerce must necessarily be restored."); (13) James
Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (circa 1830s), in 3 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 548 (stating that Connecticut has taxed imports from
Massachusetts higher than imports from Great Britain and some states' navigation laws have
"treated the Citizens of other States as aliens").
165 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice
Johnson also described the regulation of commerce as the "immediate cause" of the
Constitution. Id. at 224. Justice Johnson often cites to arguments surrounding the Articles of
Confederation, including a mandate that states not discriminate against out-of-state
Americans. As noted in the text that follows, Justice Johnson's comments are not a fair
description of the effect of the Constitution, but they are a fair description of a movement for
nationalization and against balkanization of the states, which includes the adoption of the
Articles.
"6 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the dormant commerce clause as patrolling an American
"common market" premised on the economic interdependence of the states); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,533 (1949) (asserting that "the sole purpose for which
Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was" to allow
Congress to examine the trade of the states and consider "a uniform system in their
commercial regulations"); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) ("[A]
chief occasion of the [Clommerce [C]lause[] was the mutual jealousies and aggressions of
the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.") (citations
omitted). For more support that the Commerce Clause was meant to enforce a common
market, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980), and
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977). See also
Patrick Garry, Commerce Power, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE
UNITED STATES 167 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) ("A strong impetus for calling the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the need for national controls over the nation's
commerce, which had become chaotic as many states had erected barriers to interstate trade
in an effort to protect business enterprise for its own citizens."); Jim Chen & Daniel J.
Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1315, 1323-24 (1995) (describing the desire to break down interstate trade barriers as
the impetus to political union created by the Constitution); Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Justice
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Reducing barriers on interstate trade, however, was not an important part of the
constitutional debates. The major reason for this was that the goal had already been
mostly achieved and was not challenged. The Articles of Confederation had already
prohibited any state from imposing a duty, imposition or restriction on any out-of-
state citizens that it did not impose on its own inhabitants.'67 The states seem to
have followed the norm well enough that the issue did not make it among the issues
the debaters were most concerned about. Protecting out-of-state individuals against
abuse or discrimination was an established and important norm in the debates, but
the norm shows up almost entirely in issues other than interstate barriers. As one
superb review of the evidence put it, "[tihe first thing that strikes one's attention in
seeking references directed to interstate commerce is their paucity. 16
8
Consistently, when Madison recorded the Convention's agreeing to the Com-
merce Clause, without discussion or opposition, on August 16, 1787, he described
the Clause as the "Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations... &C.
' 161
Regulation of commerce among the states shows up only within the "&c."
In retrospect over forty years after the Convention, Madison wrote that the
"power to regulate commerce among the several States" arose solely to prevent the
commercial deep-water-harbor states (e.g., New York) from abusing their power by
taxing the non-commercial states (e.g., Connecticut and New Jersey). 170 National-
ization of the impost is not the only issue that shows up under interstate commerce
in the original debates, but because none of the mercantilist restrictions were
adopted, the impost is the only issue with any continuing importance. If regulation
of commerce is (mostly) synonymous with nationalization of the state imposts, then
there is no (significant) room in the Commerce Clause for programs addressing tolls
or trade barriers between the states.
The Federalists did use the specter of trade barriers to scare voters toward
ratification of the Constitution. Hamilton argued that the various states might
impose multiple duties on interstate transportation, much as the separate German
states imposed tolls on the great rivers that flow through Germany. 7 ' "Publicola"
argued that if North Carolina did not ratify, the other states would "treat us as
Scalia and Facial Discrimination: Some Notes on Legal Reasoning, 18 VA. TAX REV. 103,
108 (1998) ("The Articles of Confederation had been unable to stem disruptive protectionism
among the several states, thus threatening the life of the infant republic.").
167 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781) ("[Tlhe people of each state shall
have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the
privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as
the inhabitants thereof respectively.").
68 Abel, supra note 3, at 470.
169 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 308.
70 Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 478.
17' THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 65, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton).
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foreigners" and thus annihilate interstate trade. 72  Rhode Island ratified the
Constitution in 1790 in large part reacting to the very real threat of facing an impost
or embargo on goods going from Rhode Island to any of the states of the Union.
73
The impetus of the complaints, however, is not to the barriers under the Articles, but
rather as a threat of what might happen if the Constitution was not ratified by a state
and the unity of the United States fell apart. Hamilton's example of interstate barriers
came from the German empire, not from the United States.'74 Tolls on interstate com-
merce would require not just a failure to ratify the Constitution, under Hamilton's
argument, but also a repeal of the Articles of Confederation prohibition on interstate
barriers, as well as an overriding of the "genius" of the American people."5
Consistent with the norm and with the mandate of the Articles, the state
imposts seem almost always to have exempted American source goods from
tax.' 76 The New York impost that was a major irritant to its neighbors exempted
goods and merchandise of the growth and manufacture of the United States.
77
The Pennsylvania impost, which also drained New Jersey, had an exemption for
goods"of the growth, produce or manufacture of the united states of America or
any of them."' 178 The Massachusetts impost 179 and the South Carolina impost 180 did
the same.
There were violations of the norm. Before 1788, Virginia had a 1% impost on
172 "Publicola," Address to the Freemen of North Carolina, ST. GAZETTE N.C., Mar. 27,
1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 495.
17' Bruce Ackerman & Neal Kumar Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U.CHI. L.
REV. 475, 538 (1995) (attributing Rhode Island's ratification heavily to a Senate-passed bill
that would prohibit Rhode Island ships in American harbors and American ships in Rhode
Island harbors); John P. Kaminski, Rhode Island: Protecting State Interests, in RATIFYING
THE CONSTITuTION 368,385 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989); John
Page, Speech at the House of Representatives (May 26, 1790), in 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS,
supra note 79, at 1672-73 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (opposing Senate-passed bill that would
embargo all goods coming from Rhode Island).
174 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 65, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton).
175 Id.
176 FORREST MCDONALD, NovUs ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 18 (1985) ("[S]ister states were exempted from restrictions against
foreigners."); Kitch, supra note 56, at 18-19 (listing the only example of a discriminatory
state tax as New York's attempt to prevent end-runs around its anti-British tax); William
Frank Zornow, New York Tariff Policies, 1775-1789, 37 N.Y. HIST. 40, 47-48 (1956)
(discussing exemptions to New York tariffs).
'" Act of Mar. 22, 1788, ch. 10, § 2, reprintedinTHEFIRSTLAWSOFTHESTATEOFNEW
YORK 10 (John D. Cushing ed., 1984) [hereinafter FIRST LAWS OF NEW YORK].
178 Act of Dec. 23, 1780, ch. 190, § 21, reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 427 (John D. Cushing ed., 1984).
"79 ACT AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETrS, 1783, ch. 12, p. 17.
18o Act of March 25. 1784. SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS 96 (1784).
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goods from "any port or place whatsoever"'' and in 1784, Virginia raised the
impost to 21/2%." s' Virginia also did not exempt vessels from other states from its
tonnage fees - the user fees for harbor maintenance. 183 In 1787, Virginia was
shamed into adopting the usual exemption for goods of American growth or manu-
facture.'84 In 1788, a Rhode Island newspaper complained that Virginia's impost
imposed prohibitive rates on American goods, 85 but by the time of the report,
Virginia had both increased its impost to 3% and exempted American goods. Prior
to its 1787 revision, the Virginia impost is a violation of the normal rule that goods
of American growth or manufacture should not bear state impost, and it seems to be
the most serious violation.
There were attempts to prevent smuggling of foreign goods in avoidance of the
state imposts, which is a different issue. New York had tried to prevent end-runs
around its impost on foreign imports by imposing taxes of 10% or four times the
normal rate, on foreign-source goods coming into New York from Connecticut and
New Jersey. 186 The target was smuggled foreign imports, however. New York had
the normal exemption for American source goods.
The New York 10% penalty tax could not have been very important
economically. Since neither neighbor had a deep-water port, the tax at issue would
have affected smugglers who unloaded the deep-water vessels offshore onto small
boats. Given that it was only a 22% impost that was being avoided, and that New
York harbor was very convenient, most shippers would have used the New York
docks and paid its fees. The New York penalty tax was also a tax on smugglers, not
a tax on legitimate interstate trades. Trying to maintain a tax on "innervating"
imports was also a very different thing from taxing interstate commerce in American
goods, especially in the thinking of the times.
Madison in the 1830s wrote that he understood that Connecticut taxed imports
from Massachusetts higher than imports from Great Britain,' 87 but if so, I have found
no evidence of it in the 1787 contemporaneous debates.
Once the anti-smuggling taxes are excluded, the violations of nondiscrimination
do not seem to have any importance. The Virginia impost before its amendment in
1787 seems to be as bad as they get, and Virginia did see the error of its ways. Even
11 STATUTES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 60, at 70.
182 Act of May 1784, ch. xiii, § 2, at 8.
83 Id. at 121-22.
184 12 STATUTES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 60, at 416.
185 NEWPORT HERALD, Feb. 7,1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
13, at 512 (complaining that Virginia's January 1788 impost created prohibitive rates for
American goods and commodities).
186 FIRST LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 177, at 10. See Kitch, supra note 56, at 18-19
for a description of the controversy.
187 James Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787 (circa 1830s), in 3
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note, 15, at 547.
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today, state discrimination against out-of-state citizens remains a considerable
problem. State legislators are always looking for ways to protect the in-state
citizens who elect them and to tax or restrict the out-of-state citizens who do not. 1
88
The pre-Constitution situation, thus, should not be judged from the norm of perfect
nondiscrimination. Albert Abel's conclusion that there is a "paucity" of references
to interstate trade in the constitutional debates holds true in this 161-cite sample.'89
B. Fairness to Out-of-State Citizens Reflected Outside the Commerce Clause
Condemnation of a state's discrimination against out-of-state citizens was
strongly felt at the time, but the norm shows up in the constitutional debates mostly
on issues besides the (phantom) tolls on interstate commerce. Prohibition against
discrimination was commonly used to justify provisions outside of the Commerce
Clause, but for rules expressed elsewhere, the Commerce Clause is not carrying any
extra weight. The Constitution nationalized the state imposts, for example, relying
in part on the argument that the state imposts under the Confederation allowed the
states with good deep-water harbors - and especially New York - to tax their
uncommercial neighbors.'90 The Constitution, similarly, prohibited export taxes to
188 For a review of the legal literature on restraining state discrimination against out-of-
state citizens, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, 1029-43
(3d ed. 2000). Compare Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 43 (1988) (defending the need of the Commerce Clause to prevent
discrimination and to protect economic union), with Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial
Constitution, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 217, 222 (expressing skepticism that the dormant
commerce clause serves efficiency, democracy, or national union), and Kitch, supra note 56
(arguing that free trade policies would inevitably have triumphed and without the warping
interference from the federal government).
'89 Abel, supra note 3, at 470.
190 (1) THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 24, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that
New York had the opportunity to render Connecticut and New Jersey a tributary through
commercial regulations by laying duties on importations); (2) Letter from Timothy Pickering
to John Pickering (Dec. 29, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 177
(attacking New York because it put into her own treasury all the duties arising on the goods
consumed in Connecticut, New Jersey, Vermont and western Massachusetts); (3) THE
FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 24, at 283 (James Madison) (stating that power to regulate
commerce between the states was adopted to prevent commercial states from collecting
improper and unfair contributions from their noncommercial neighbors); (4) Letter from
James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at
478 (writing that the power to regulate commerce "grew out of the abuse of the power by the
importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and
preventative provision against injustice among the States themselves"); (5) James Madison,
Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (circa 1830), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra
note 15, at 542 (A cause of the Constitution was that some of the states had "no convenient
ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, thro[ugh] whose
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prevent the deep-water-harbor "commercial" states from taxing export goods
produced in neighboring "uncommercial" states. 9 ' The Constitution prohibits
"Preference... to the Ports of one State over those of another,"'92 because such port
preferences would affect the states unevenly. 193 The anti-discrimination norm was
strongly felt, but it was used primarily to justify goals accomplished in the text
outside of the Commerce Clause.
Consistently, the Constitution's adoption of protection for creditors' rights was
justified in part in terms ofjustice across state lines. The Constitution prohibits states
from impairing contracts, and in the constitutional debates, this prohibition was said
to be necessary to prevent "aggressions on the rights of other States"'" and injury
to the citizens of other States. 9 The Constitution prohibits states from issuing paper
money and from making anything but gold and silver as legal tender in payments
of debts. 96 Commerce in North Carolina, William Davie claimed, has been ruined
by iniquitous laws that discourage industry by legalizing "the payment of just debts
by paper, which represents nothing, or property of very trivial value."'1 97 Wicked
Rhode Island had attempted to require out-of-state creditors to accept Rhode Island
ports, their commerce was carried on. New Jersey, placed between [Philadelphia and New
York], was likened to a Cask tapped at both ends."); (6) id. at 547 (stating that Rhode Island
was well-known to have been swayed by "an obdurate adherence to an advantage which her
position gave her of taxing her neighbors [through] their consumption of imported supplies").
1 (7) Gouverneur Morris, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 21,
1787), in 2 FARRAND'S REcoRDs, supra note 15, at 360 (Without prohibition on state export
taxes, deep-water harbor "States will tax the produce of their uncommercial neighbours.");
(8) James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 16, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 307 (opposing the prohibition on tax on exports but
dwelling "on the injustice and impolicy of leaving N[ew] Jersey [and] Connecticut...
subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours"); (9) Roger Sherman, Speech at the
Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 16, 1787), in FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 308 (Although supporting prohibition of tax on exports, Sherman observed that "[t]he
oppression of the uncommercial States [by commercial States] was guarded [against] by the
power to regulate trade between the States.").
192 (10) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
193 Charles Pinckney, Speech at the House of Representatives (Feb. 14, 1820), in 36
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 24 at 1317-18 (arguing that congressional power over
interstate commerce by water between the states was given to prevent, among other things,
port preferences).
114 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 24, at 349.
'9' THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 24, at 300-01 (James Madison) (If states were
given the power to issue money, then "the intercourse among them would be impeded;
retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be
injured and animosities be kindled among the States themselves.").
196 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
'9' William R. Davie, Speech at the North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 24,
1788), in 4 ELuoT's DEBATES, supra note 13, at 20 (emphasis omitted).
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dollars, worth twenty cents on the dollar, as if they were worth face value.' 9 Paper
money was a trick, Governeur Morris explained, that harmed citizens of other states.' 99
State debtor relief laws were prohibited by the Constitution as "impairments to
the Obligation of Contracts '20 0 and the prohibition was similarly thought necessary
as a security to commerce against abuse by the states. Debtor relief was a dis-
crimination issue, stated Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, in that "the interest
of.. . citizens of different states may be affected."' ' Merchants could trust their
local correspondents in other states, James Wilson told Pennsylvania, but they could
not trust their property to the laws of the state in which their correspondents live.2"2
Similarly, federal courts were given judicial power over suits between citizens of
different states, Madison told Virginia, to favor the commercial states by allowing
creditors to avoid state courts, where the creditor remedies might be "imaginary and
nominal."20 3
"Commerce" between or within the states was also used to justify other federal
powers enumerated in the Constitution's description of federal powers. In the
Ratification debates, for instance, The Federalist referred to the coining of money
and to federal bankruptcy law2"4 as "commerce" issues. Hamilton said that the
coinage and regulation of weights and measures, allowed by Clause 4 of Article I,
Section 8, were appropriate federal powers, just as the King of England had such
powers as the "arbiter of commerce. 20 5 For the national powers allowed elsewhere,
however, the Commerce Clause is not adding anything.
Federal supervision of commerce was considered strong enough to send the fed-
eral government into issues of "internal police" of the states. In Philadelphia, Roger
Sherman of Connecticut proposed giving immunity from congressional activity for
198 POLISHOOK, supra note 43, at 179.
9 Gouverneur Morris, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, July 17, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 26.
200 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
20 Letter from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Samuel Huntington
(Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 352.
202 James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in
2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 13, at 492.
203 James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 13, at 534-35.
204 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 24, at 287 (James Madison) ("The power of
establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy [is properly federal because it] is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States ... ").
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(stating that the King of England in his capacity as "the arbiter of commerce" can establish
markets and fairs, regulate weights and measures, coin money, and authorize or prohibit the
circulation of foreign coins).
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"internal police" of the states.20 6 The Convention rejected the immunity for internal
police by the margin of two states for and eight against.2 7 Consistently, in the
consideration of the Bill of Rights, the Anti-Federalists attempted to insert an exemp-
tion from federal power for internal police of the states, but the proposal failed.20 8
"Internal police ought to be infringed," Governeur Morris told the convention, "as
in the case of paper money [and] other tricks" because citizens of other states might
be affected. 209 In the Federalist, Publius sold the Constitution by arguing the
authority of the union would be strengthened when it extends to "matters of internal
concern" because by circulating there it could win the loyalty of the people.1 0
The norm of justice among the states was also cited in failed attempts to defeat
provisions that the Constitution in fact adopted. The Constitution allows Congress
to enact an American navigation act, giving United States vessels a monopoly on ship-
ping American commodities by simple majority vote of the Congress. Opponents
wanted to require a two-thirds vote for a navigation act so that a "few rich mer-
chants" from New York, Philadelphia, and Boston could not "plunder the South.. 2
Sometimes the norm against discrimination leads to over-reaction. The Framers
worried that "tonnage fees" - imposed on ships according to their weight to pay for
the upkeep of the harbor, wharves and lighthouses - might be used to discriminate
206 Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 629.
207 James Madison, Notes of the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 26. See also James Madison, Speech at the Federal Convention,
(Madison's notes, June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 318 for
Madison's attack on the New Jersey plan on the ground that it would not "secure a good
internal legislation [and] administration to the particular States."
A supplanted draft of the Articles of Confederation had reserved for the states power
over their internal police. The draft was replaced by language more protective of the states,
saying that Congress would have only powers expressly delegated to it. See discussion by
Thomas Burke who instigated the change in his Letter to Governor Richard Caswell of North
Carolina (Apr. 29, 1777), in 7 JOURNALS 122-23 n.4 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1907).
208 Debate at the House of Representatives (Aug. 18, 1789), in I ANNALS OF CONGRESS,
supra note 79, at 790-92 (reporting the defeat of an amendment offered by Rep. Thomas
Tudor Tucker to prohibit Congress from overriding any state or district law, within a state
or district without the consent of that state or district).
209 Gouverneur Morris, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, July 17, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 26.
210 THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 173-74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(arguing for an extension of the federal government "to what are called matters of internal
concern" so as to increase the people's familiarity with the government and to decrease their
violent resistance).
2. George Mason, Speech at the Federal Convention (Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in
2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 63 1. Cf Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George
Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 3 MASON PAPERS, supra note 13 1, at 996 ("Whilst the Commercial
plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious Trader.").
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against out-of-staters and the Constitution prohibits states from imposing tonnage,
in absence of congressional approval. 2 ' Some discrimination makes sense because
the tonnage rates appropriate for vessels carrying full cargoes across the Atlantic
that visited no more than twice a year would be far too high for local or short-haul
vessels that were in and out of the harbor with half cargoes many times a week. The
states, moreover, would be expected to dredge the harbors, erect the lighthouses and
keep up the piers and wharves by state taxes alone, and tonnage was a fine way to
get the users to pay for the state's services."t 3 The prohibition on tonnage was thus
probably an overreaction, driven by the strong norms of nondiscrimination and
anger at the rogue states who could be expected to misbehave if allowed to. In sum,
the norm that states had to respect the rights of citizens of other states was strong in
the constitutional debates, but in these illustrations, it shows up as an argument for
or against other provisions and not as an attack on any existing interstate tolls or
restrictions.
As the Constitution was developing, Madison himself seemed to have
considered his mercantilist port preferences project to be more important than the
anti-discrimination rule. When Virginia passed its port restrictions in 1784, it added
an exemption for Virginia-owned ships, which could dock anywhere they wanted.
Madison confessed to Monroe that applying the port restriction to out-of-state
citizens, but not to Virginia citizens, was a violation of the Articles of Confeder-
ation, an "erratum which will no doubt be rectified." '214 The comment is just cavalier
enough about the violation of the Articles to show that in Madison's mind, the
restrictive, port preference project was more important than the anti-discrimination
norm.
The constitutional document, in fact, arguably does some harm to a barrier-free
market because it failed to bring over the Articles' express prohibition on dis-
crimination. The norm against trade barriers was strong throughout the period, and
was not in contention, but apparently the very lack of contention meant that the
constitutional drafters did not repeat the Articles' prohibition of discrimination. The
212 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. See James Madison, Speech at the Federal Convention
(Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 625 (arguing
that the regulation of commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under
one authority).
213 See James McHenry, Notes of the Federal Convention (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 504 (stating that it "does not appear that the national legislature
can erect light houses or clean out or preserve the navigation of harbours") (emphasis
omitted). See also James McHenry & Daniel Carrol, Speech at the Federal Convention
(Madison notes, Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 625 (moving
unsuccessfully that "no State shall be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose
of clearing harbours and erecting light-houses").
24 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 55, at 103.
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Articles of Confederation, but not the constitutional text, prohibit a state from
imposing a tax or restriction on an out-of-state citizen that it is unwilling to impose
on one of its own.2"5 Arguably the omission did little harm. The courts have
actively developed what is called the "dormant commerce clause" to prevent
discrimination directed toward out-of-staters." 6 Some commentators have, however,
opposed application of an anti-discrimination norm, at least in its strongest versions,
on the ground that the Constitution did not include it in its text.217 Congress can act
to regulate commerce between the states, because the specific words of Clause 3, the
Commerce Clause, give Congress this power, but the dormant commerce clause,
giving the judiciary the responsibility of enforcing nondiscrimination by the states
in absence of federal legislation, must rest on norms that were well expressed in the
Articles but not in the Constitution.2t8 Fairness to citizens of other states, in any
event, was a deep norm that shows up in the constitutional debates, but not as to
tolls on interstate commerce nor as to viable programs with the Commerce Clause.
IV. WORDS WITHOUT CONTROVERSIES
There are also twenty-two quotes within the sample which are not attached to
any remedy or in which the reference is too vague to ascertain what is meant. These
quotes are not included in the 139 cites, or 100%, used to determine what percentage
any one advocated program represents. Indeed, the quotes without controversies are
under-collected, since I increasingly passed over quotes without a clear reference to
a program as time went. Nonetheless, this sample gives some indication of what is
out there, outside of the references to programs that I use as the baseline 100%.
215 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781).
216 See supra note 188.
217 Justices Scalia and Thomas would be willing to roll back the dormant commerce clause
to reach only discriminations on the face of a state statute, in part because there is no
authority for anti-discrimination in the text. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 200-01 (1995); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 94-95 (1987). See
also Lino A. Graglia, The Supreme Court and the American Common Market, in
REGULATION, FEDERAUSM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 67, 70 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981)
(arguing that in the absence of text, policing discrimination against out-of-staters is a
function the Court should not perform); Accord Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKEL. J. 569,
571 (arguing that the dormant commerce clause is without basis in text or structure).
28 Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117-18
(1988) would find the prohibition against discrimination in the Article IV, Section 2 language
that "Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States," but the language needs to be stretched to reach corporations as well as
individual citizens, to reach goods as well as citizens and to focus on accomplishing an
economic union, more than preserving individual "rights."
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Sixteen quotes in the sample, without any program attached, contrast "com-
merce" with either "manufacturing" or "agriculture," at least to the extent of listing
commerce separately.2 19 Some of the quotes show that the Founders worried
29 (1) James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in
9 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 24, at 350 (calling for new Constitution to fix defects of
commercial affairs blocked by perverseness of particular states, including law of
naturalization and of copyright, incorporations for national purposes, the providing of
national universities and the building of "canals and other works of general utility"); (2) PA.
MERCURY, June 28, 1787, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 210
("[Aigriculture, manufactures, and commerce, shall impart their blessings, and enrich our
country."); (3) NORWICH PACKET (Conn.), July 5, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 167 ("Commerce must take the lead, agriculture next follow, and
manufactures should bring up the rear."); (4) PA. GAZETTE, Aug. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 182 (America should adopt the means of
"agriculture and manufactures" in order to obtain "growth in wealth , independence and
happiness," yet "[s]he has no business with commerce, until she derives it from the products
of the earth, or from her own arts.") (emphasis omitted); (5) James Madison, Speech at the
Federal Convention (Madison notes, Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
15, at 452 (stating that Connecticut and New Jersey were "agricultural, not commercial
States"); (6) Elbridge Gerry, Speech at the Federal Convention (King notes, Sept. 15, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 15, at 635 (objecting to the Constitution because "[t]he
Power given [respecting] Commerce will enable the Legislature to create corporations and
monopolies"); (7) Letter from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Samuel
Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 352 (arguing
that restrictions on state debt-relief legislation were thought necessary as a security to
commerce because the interests of foreigners and citizens of other states might be affected);
(8) Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution
(Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 597
("Landed property in England will never be sufficiently distributed, to give the powers of
government wholly into the hands of the people [but that here commerce and manufacturing
have] thrown a vast weight of property into the democratic scale."); (9) THE FEDERALIST
No. 12, supra note 24, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to "rivalships" between
agriculture and commerce); (10) "An American Citizen" [Tench Coxe], To Richard Henry
Lee, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 28, 1787-Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 169 (contrasting commerce and agriculture and arguing that even
in commercial states, agriculture predominates); (11) "An Old Man," CARLISLE GAZETTE,
Jan. 2, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 228 (reporting a
toast to "[a]n increase of the agriculture, manufactures and commerce of America"); (12)
"Centinel VIII," PHILA. INDEP. GAZETrEER, Jan. 2, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 233 ("[Elvery concern of individuals will be sacrificed to the
gratification of the men in power, who will institute injurious monopolies and shackle
commerce with every device of avarice."); (13) THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 160, at
219 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that many mechanics and manufacturers are immediately
connected with commerce and that merchants are their natural friends); (14) Resolutions of
the Tradesmen of the Town of Boston, MASS. GAZETrE, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 292 ("[I]f the proposed frame of government
should be rejected, the small remains of commerce yet left us, will be annihilated, the various
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a lot about too much commerce, which is consistent with mercantilist economics that
considered foreign imports to be innervating. Some, blessedly, have no specific
remedy in mind. Charles Pinckney, for instance, adopted a physiocratic argument
in South Carolina that there were only three ways for a nation to acquire wealth -
the first is by war, which is "robbery." The second is in commerce, "which is
generally cheating." The third is agriculture, which is "the only honest way. ' 20 The
theory of the Physiocrats that all other human activities were parasites upon
agriculture, would, of course, have been especially attractive to the planters. The
natural supremacy of agriculture under physiocratic principles, however, did not
seem to have any program attached to it, at least in America.
The usages of the word "commerce," listed separately from "agriculture" or
"manufacturing," do not seem to preclude more inclusive definitions of "commerce."
"Regulation of commerce" is sometimes used to mean only nationalizing the state
imposts"' or used to justify other enumerated powers. Those usages, however, do
not seem to preclude other government programs that would be allowed under
broader definitions of "commerce." "Regulation of commerce" was an omnibus
term with a cloud of both specific and more general references. The more specific
meanings do not seem to exclude any others. Given how "utterly wrongheaded" the
Physiocrats were, in any event, it does seem quite lucky that physiocratic attitudes
toward "commerce" are not the only meaning embodied in our Constitution.
trades and handicrafts dependent thereon, must decay."); (15) "A Columbian Patriot,"
Observations on the Constitution (Boston), Feb. 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 278 ("[T]here are few who do not unite in the general wish for
the restoration of public faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry, under
a lenient, peaceable and energetic[] government."); (16) Charles Pinckney, Speech at the
South Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 581 (quoting an unidentified author on national wealth:
"there are but three ways for a nation to acquire wealth").
Justice Thomas includes twelve cites in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), in which agriculture or manufacturing are contrasted with
"commerce," only three of which seem to overlap with this sample.
220 Charles Pinckney, Speech at the South Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14,
1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 581.
221 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, supra note 24, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton).
222 Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUMB. L. REv. 1, 18 (1999).
See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 125-42 (4th ed.
1921) (describing the Physiocrats and their influence). Voluntary trades add value to both
sides, if they are voluntary, and manufacture adds immense value to its raw materials, not
all of which come from agriculture. Adam Smith's critique, concluding that agriculture is not
the exclusive source of wealth, was devastating. There is something awful about reading a
distinction between agriculture and "nonproductive" activity as the constitutional distinction,
even if planters liked it. This is supposed to be a durable Constitution, interpreted sympa-
thetically. Commerce, in any event, has other definitions in 1787 in which agriculture is not
the key distinction.
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Words that do not have any programs attached to them also do not seem to carry
any water as a cause tending toward the adoption of the Constitution. Clause 3, for
instance, gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, but
there were no controversies in trade with the Indians that show up in the sample.
The Constitution just repeated the power allowed to the Congress by the Articles of
Confederation, without treating the power as having any weight. 223 Regulation of
trade with the Indians is not a substantial cause of the Constitution, even though the
trade with the Indians is included in the words. So similarly other usages of
"commerce," without any program or remedy behind them cannot have had
substantial influence on the adoption of the Constitution.
Finally, six references to "commerce" are so general as to not give a sufficient
clue about the controversy or even arena they are talking about.224 Some are
important, for example, George Washington's cover letter for the Constitution citing
the power to regulate commerce as one of the reasons for ratification. The
interpretation here is that these references are trying to talk about all cases fitting
under "regulation of commerce" and that they are therefore proxies for the full
universe of "commerce," the content and mix of which are determined by the other
cites in the sampling. These six too-general references are also not part of the total
sample used to calculate percentages for the other programs.
223 The congressional trade with the Indians comes from the Articles of Confederation,
which provided that Congress had the power to regulate "the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians, not members of any of the states." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX
(U.S. 1781). It was added to a draft of the Commerce Clause, which provided that Congress
could regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, on September 4, 1787
by motion of the Committee of Eleven (chaired by David Brearly) and adopted without
dissent. James Madison, Notes of the Federal Convention (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 499.
224 (1) Letter from the President of the Federal Convention [George Washington] to the
President of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION
OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 1003 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927) (stating that
desire is for general government to have the power to make war, peace, and treaties, levy
money and regulate commerce); (2) Alexander Hamilton, Conjectures About the New
Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 9 (The
Constitution probably would be ratified because "the good will of the commercial interest
throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government
capable of regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union."); (3) THE
FEDERALIST No. 11, supra note 65, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[A] unity of commercial,
as well as political interests, can only result from [a] unity of government."); (4) "Centinel
VI," PA. PACKET, Dec. 25, 1787, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13,
at 99 (opposing the Constitution by saying that people are so impatient "to reap the golden
harvest of regulated commerce, that they will not take time to secure their liberty and
happiness"); (5) Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27,
1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 600 (stating that the members
of that Convention thought unanimously, that the control of commerce should be given to
Congress); (6) THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 314 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(stating that the regulation of commerce is a new power, but one that few oppose).
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V. How IMPORTANT WAS COMMERCE AS A CAUSE?
The programs that the advocates contemplated within the Commerce Clause
were in total very modest. The retaliatory impost against the British and the
monopoly for American vessels for American commodities were touted by the
Federalists, but they were never enacted, once the Constitution was adopted, even
in the overwhelmingly Federalist First Congress that could do as it wished on the
issue. As it turned out, even proponents of the Constitution did not really want to
provoke the ire of the British and risk loss of access to the British ports, once they
thought seriously about it. Port preferences were even more starkly rejected within
the Convention itself. "Regulation of commerce" was also a code word to justify
replacing the 2 % New York state impost with a 5% federal impost, but that
replacement was needed to pay Revolutionary War debts and restore the public
credit, and it should be understood therefore as a tax and war debt issue, adequately
covered by the Tax Powers Clause. There is no purely Commerce Clause program
that had any legs.
Given the modest original size of the Commerce Clause, it is ironic that the
Commerce Clause has come to be viewed as the general jurisdictional boundary of
the federal government. The Commerce Clause seems in strict historical context no
more important than the next clause, Clause 4, which authorized Congress to make
a national bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy power remained, a "mere dead letter,"
as Story's Commentaries put it in 1833.225 A national bankruptcy act was not passed
until 1898,226 considerably too late for the bankruptcy to be a live cause of the
Constitution. Given the 110-year delay, the Bankruptcy Clause cannot be called a
significant cause of the Constitution, although it is listed in Section 8. The same is
true for the Commerce Clause. Arguably recognizably modest clauses, like punish-
ing counterfeiting (Clause 6) and establishing post roads and post offices (Clause 7)
are more meaningful historical contributions to adoption of the Constitution.
The modesty and mercantilist focus of the original Commerce Clause should not
bother us very much. The panda's thumb, so essential for survival, evolved from
what was originally a tiny wrist bone and it became an effective bamboo cutting tool
only by evolution over time. Things change. Edmund Burke was surely right that
human beings and human institutions change only slowly - it is impossible to start
from scratch.227 Still a lot of incremental changes have occurred since 1787, and it
225 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 3: § 1105 (1833), reprinted
in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 641.
226 See, e.g., Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 CoM. LJ. 160
(1991) (describing the history of American bankruptcy legislation and proposals through the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
227 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Conor O'Brien rev.
ed., 1969) (1790).
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would be error as well to presume that everything sincerely meant in 1787 is both
wise and binding today.
The Founders' true intent should not be binding on us, among other reasons,
because their most intense meanings were focused on the short term and on
programs that would be adopted or abandoned in short order. The prior constitution,
the Articles of Confederation, had been ratified only in 1781,228 so that judging from
their experience, a constitution should be expected to last no more than six or seven
years. The Founders were essentially politicians trying to get specific things
accomplished, and in politics six months is a very long time. There were undoubt-
edly implications beyond the specific programs they wanted, but the specific
programs are the hard rock in the water and the ripples grow smaller the farther we
go from the rock. It is very hard to write eternal verities binding two hundred years
hence, when that is not a significant part of what you are trying to do. They could
solve our problems no better than we can now solve the critical problems of the year
2221, whatever they are.
The modesty of the commerce power also makes it difficult to lean on it to
explain the constitutional revolution. The Constitution replaced the sovereignty of
the states with the sovereignty of the people, and created a new government on the
federal level supreme over the states. Clause 1, the first power listed, gives the
federal government the power to tax to provide for the common defense and general
welfare. The tax power gave effect and consequence to the federal government.
The explanation for the constitutional revolution thus plausibly resides in Clause 1,
tax to provide for common defense and general welfare, rather than in Clause 3, the
Commerce Clause. The power to adopt programs that the country did not in fact
want and constitutional language with no significant programs or grievances
attached to it gives no meaningful help in explaining why the Founders created the
constitutional revolution. The important causes of the Constitution have to lie
elsewhere.
228 19 JOURNALS, supra note 30, at 214 (Mar. 1, 1781).
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